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The purpose of this dissertation is to determine whether it is important for 
the future development of legal systems in post-authoritarian or post-conflict 
states to confront the unjust past legacy of their judiciaries. In order to 
determine this, one has to assess the extent to which addressing the unjust 
past legacy of such judiciaries, by means of transitional justice mechanisms, 
has contributed to achieving the objectives of judicial reform is these 
contexts. This is accomplished by firstly, analysing the contribution of the 
TRC Legal Hearing to judicial reform in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
Secondly, the contribution which the vetting of the Kenyan judiciary made 
to achieving judicial reform in Kenya after the 2007 Election crisis is 
assessed. In both circumstances, the final contributions of these transitional 
justice mechanisms to achieving the objectives of judicial reform are 
weighed against the contributions of other mechanisms. It is argued that both 
the transitional justice mechanisms of truth commissions and judicial vetting 
contributed to achieving objectives of judicial reform in South Africa and 
Kenya. However, the extent of the contributions differed in each case 
because of unique political factors. It is concluded that confronting the 
unjust past legacy of judiciaries in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states 
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There have been times in history where judiciaries have failed to conduct 
themselves according to the international standards expected of the 
profession. Instances of judicial misconduct, judicial corruption, unfair bias, 
enforcement of unjust laws, and judicial complicity in a regime‟s oppression 
of its citizens, have been and can be found in states all over the world.  
 
When the time has come to reform the judiciary in such states, different 
approaches have been taken in order to deal with a legacy of injustices and 
wrongs of a particular judiciary. These range from putting the judges of the 
Nazi Regime on trial for their implementation of unjust laws at Nuremberg, 
to vetting procedures applied to the judiciaries in many former communist 
states, and the decision taken against vetting in South Africa.
1
 Kenya is 
possibly the first African state that has attempted to use a vetting board to 




South Africa and Kenya are African states that have taken different routes to 
reforming their respective judiciaries. The political situations that prevailed 
and the acts of improper judicial behaviour were different in both countries. 
Yet both have had the similar goal of successfully reforming their judiciaries 
and ensuring that their judiciaries conduct themselves accordingly in the 
future.  
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Judicial reform in post-Apartheid South Africa is a case of such reform in a 
post-authoritarian setting, which decided against vetting its judiciary because 
of the nature of its negotiated transition.
3
 Instead, the legacy of the former 
Apartheid judiciary was dealt with in a special hearing by the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter referred to as the „TRC‟). 
Kenya,  an example of judicial reform in a post-conflict setting, chose 





The title of this dissertation, „Is little to be gained by lamenting the past?‟ is 
derived from a quote and must be seen in context.  The quote was made by 
Arthur Chaskalson, the first President of the South African Constitutional 
Court. He was considering whether it was indeed wise to dwell on the 
judicial record of the South African courts, in terms of the TRC‟s work, 
when he stated: 
 
„That they could have done better than they did is, I think, now clear. But 




To expand on this statement, several concepts may be explored. Firstly, it is 
clear that by merely dwelling on the past or mourning „what should have 
been‟ or „what could have been done better‟ will not achieve much. Yet 
confronting the past, acknowledging the truth about what was wrong and the 
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mistakes that were made and using these to assist in rebuilding a nation, may 
be useful.  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine whether it is important for 
the future development of legal systems in post-authoritarian or post-conflict 
states to confront the unjust past legacy or former abusive record of their 
judiciaries. In other words this dissertation seeks to establish if addressing 
the unjust past legacy of a judiciary in one of these contexts, via the means 
of transitional justice mechanisms, is a meaningful or pointless exercise. 
 
Hence the question this dissertation poses is: To what extent has addressing 
the past legacy of the South African and Kenyan judiciaries, by means of 
transitional justice mechanisms, contributed to achieving the objectives of 
judicial reform in both of these countries? 
 
Chapter 1 will provide an introductory framework for the discussion to 
follow. The key concepts will be defined and expanded upon in order for the 
reader to gain a better understanding of the framework in which the country-
specific discussion will take place.  
 
Chapter 2 will provide a theoretical analysis of the two transitional justice 
mechanisms (truth commissions and judicial vetting) that were used in South 
Africa and Kenya to aid in the reform of their judiciaries.  
 
Chapter 3 will assess the extent to which the TRC Legal Hearing contributed 




Chapter 4 will assess the extent to which the vetting of the Kenyan judiciary 
contributed to achieving the objectives of judicial reform in Kenya.  
 
By way of conclusion, it is submitted that both the transitional justice 
mechanisms of truth commissions and judicial vetting  contributed to 
achieving the objectives of judicial reform in South Africa and Kenya. The 
extent of the contributions made differed in both cases. However, it was 
ultimately determined that it is important for the future development of legal 
systems in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states to confront the unjust 























In order to answer the question posed by this dissertation, it is necessary to 
establish a framework within which this discussion will take place. This 
chapter will define the key concepts that are relevant for the purposes of this 
discussion and use them to establish the analytical framework required.  
 
1.1 JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN  AND 
POST-CONFLICT STATES 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation it is important to understand the 
environment that prevails within legal systems in post-authoritarian and 
post-conflict states.  
 
A post-authoritarian situation exists when a state is emerging from a system 
of autocratic rule. A post-conflict situation refers to a state that is emerging 
from a war, internal rebellion or where general conflict and chaos has 
ensued. Usually in such states there has been either a severe deterioration or 
complete breakdown of the Rule of Law, and their judiciaries have not 
conducted themselves accordingly.  
 
In post-authoritarian states (in which a relatively sophisticated but tainted 
legal infrastructure might remain) there is, as Corder discusses in his article 
„Judicial Authority in a changing South Africa‟, „the need urgently to design 
institutions of governance to facilitate democratic transformation‟.
6
 In 
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essence this is where one is dealing with, as put by Dyzenhaus, „a systematic 
problem which amounts to a failure of the institutions of a democratic state 
to live up to its ideals‟.
7
  Judiciaries in these states are often tainted by too 
close an association with the previous authoritarian regime, or have a clear 
record of complicity with the previous regime in the commission of human 
rights violations. 
 
Ndulo and Duthie discuss in their article „The role of judicial reform in 
development and transitional justice‟, that in many post-conflict states one 
legacy of the conflict these states share is: 
 
the lack of national institutions to deal with past and present human rights 
violations, to advance good governance, to deal with massive poverty, 





They continue to explain that often in these states there only exists a very 
basic legal infrastructure that has survived the damage done by the conflict.
9
 
Often the key personnel that managed this legal infrastructure have „fled, 
been killed, or been compromised by association with the previous 
regime‟.
10
 The legal infrastructure‟s functioning in such contexts is often 
severely hampered by both human and operational shortages.  
                                                 
7
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Thus, in many post-authoritarian and post-conflict states the improper 
conduct of their judiciaries has contributed to the severe deterioration or 
complete breakdown of the Rule of Law that has occurred.  
 
1.2 DEFINITION OF THE RULE OF LAW 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation it is essential to explain the doctrine of 
the Rule of Law. 
 
Mathews viewed the Rule of Law as a doctrine that was „concerned with the 
relationship between the government and citizen and with the legal control 




Accordingly he believed that all writings concerning the Rule of Law could 
be grouped according to four categories: (1) law enforcement theories; (2) 
theories of the Rule of Law as procedural justice; (3) the Rule of Law as 
justice in the material or substantive sense; and (4) theories of the Rule of 
Law as the protection of the citizen‟s basic rights through definite rules 




Mathews regarded the first three of these approaches as unsatisfactory. He 
maintained that the fourth approach, that of Dicey‟s doctrine, was the most 
compelling.
13
 This was his chosen theory, and the definition that follows 
below is Mathews‟ reformulation of Dicey‟s doctrine in a modern manner. 
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The definition of the Rule of Law that should be adopted for the purposes of 
this dissertation is a follows: 
 
(1) Government, according to the Rule of Law, means that with a view to 
the preservation of the basic rights enumerated in the second 
proposition below, the relevant laws shall take the form of pre-
announced, general, durable and reasonably precise rules administered 
by regular courts or similar independent tribunals according to fair 
procedures; 
 
(2) The basic freedoms of person, conscience, speech, information, 
movement, meeting and association shall be equally guaranteed by the 
law to all citizens of the society; 
 
(3) Any limitations on the civil rights or freedom enumerated in the 
second proposition shall be in the form of rules conforming to the 
requirements of legality expressed in the first proposition. 
Furthermore, restrictions on the basic freedoms shall be limited in 
scope and, except in times of genuine crisis or emergency, shall not 





Mathews referred to this definition as the „substantive content‟ of the Rule 
of Law. Following is the „procedural machinery‟ which consists of legal 
institutions, procedures and traditions which give „practical reality‟ to the 
idea.
15
 Of these „procedural machinery‟, the judiciary is of vital importance.  
 
Mathews observed that: 




 Mathews op cit note 11at 23. 
13 
 
The Rule of Law and an independent judiciary vested with power to 
adjudicate over basic rights are so closely related to each other as to be like 





1.3 THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-
AUTHORITARIAN AND POST-CONFLICT STATES 
 
The re-establishment of the Rule of Law has therefore been accepted as 
„essential for reconstruction and long-term stability‟ in post-authoritarian 
and post-conflict states.
17
 Extensive Rule-of-law projects are now engaged in 
by conflict management, peace-building and development actors, with the 
belief that the re-establishment of the Rule of Law „will contribute to good 





As per Mathews‟ definition, two important requirements for the re-
establishment for the Rule of Law are a functioning legal system and an 
independent judiciary. Dr. Rama Mani argues that in order to facilitate 
restoration of the Rule of Law in a post-authoritarian or post-conflict state 
institutional reform of the justice system (the judiciary, police and the 
prisons) is required.
19
  This dissertation is clearly concerned with the reform 
of the judiciary, which Mani also views as one of the essential pillars for the 
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 Rama Mani Beyond Retribution: Seeking justice in the shadows of war (2002) 56.  
20
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Mani‟s  argument is that long-term sustainable peace cannot exist in a post-
authoritarian or post-conflict state, unless justice has been achieved for past 
atrocities and human rights violations.
21
 She identifies three different 
dimensions of justice that need to be achieved, these being rectificatory 




For these three dimensions of justice to be achieved; the necessary starting 
point is to understand and address the corresponding injustices suffered by 




Therefore, in order to restore legal justice or the Rule of Law (as they are 
interchangeable terms) in post-authoritarian or post-conflict states, the 
corresponding legal injustices need to be understood and addressed. These 
legal injustices could include: 
 
the breakdown of the Rule of Law, the political manipulation of the legal 
system, the corruption of law makers, law enforcers and judges, and the 





In order to be successful in reforming the judiciary and ultimately the 
restoration of the Rule of Law, there needs to be an understanding of how 
and why there was a complete deterioration of the Rule of Law in the first 
place.  
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24
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Mani submits that she has observed the Rule of Law programmes 
established in many post-authoritarian or post-conflict states.
25
 Some of 
these programmes are very quick to use the restoration of the Rule of Law to 
only re-establish order and security.
26
 They focus on reforming institutions, 
mechanics, and the form and structure of the Rule of Law, rather than the 
ethos of it. These programmes also tend not to incorporate knowledge and 
integration of cultural and historical specificities, and the needs of individual 
societies, in to their reform efforts.
27
 There is not enough emphasis on 
ensuring that the fundamental principles of the Rule of Law are entrenched 





In one of her articles on this matter Mani  quotes an observation made in the 
context of post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda: 
 
The real challenge (in restoring the judicial system) is not of marshalling 
sufficient human and technical resources, but of institutionalising a new 
political culture in which differences are settled through discussion, 




According to Mani, the only way to instil a „new political culture‟ in the new 
judiciary which entrenches the „ethos‟ of the Rule of Law, is if the root 
causes of legal injustices are understood and addressed by reform efforts.  
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 Mani op cit note 21 at 31.  
29
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Only by doing this and understanding local grievances with the previous 
judicial sector, and incorporating these into reform efforts, will the Rule of 
Law (substantially and formatively) be restored. The Rule of Law can only 
be effectively restored in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states if it is 
understood how the conduct of judiciaries in such contexts contributed to its 
deterioration.  
 
1.4 THE OBJECTIVES OF JUDICIAL REFORM EFFORTS 
 
The next concept that needs to be addressed is that of judicial reform. It has 
been argued that such reform is vital for the restoration of the Rule of Law, 
but how such reform is actually achieved requires further attention. 
 
Judicial reform can be defined as „measures intended to reform the courts, 
prosecutors‟ office, and other institutions that make up the judicial 
system‟.
30
   
 
There are many international standards or types of „codes of good practice‟ 
such as the „Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary‟ that 
provide excellent guidelines as to how a judicial institution should function 
in a modern state. These have provided valuable guidelines as to what the 
objectives of judicial reform efforts should be.  
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Some authors believe that judicial reform can be considered in terms of three 





1.4.1 Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence means that a separation of powers must exist between 
the three ruling spheres of government: the executive, legislature and the 
judiciary.
32
 Therefore, the functions of making the law, executing the law, 
and resolving disputes through the application of the law should be kept 
separate and performed by different government officials.
33
 Judicial 
authority must reside in the judiciary as a separate organ of government, 
composed of different people from and independent to, those who compose 
the executive and legislature.
34
 This independent judicial body must also 
serve as a check to the execution of the executive‟s and legislature‟s power. 
One of the most common forms of a check on the power of the executive 
and legislature is „the power of the judiciary to review laws and the conduct 




One of the leading international instruments that establishes the guidelines 
for judicial independence is The United Nations Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary („Basic Principles‟). Trebilcock and Daniels 
highlight the main mechanisms, stated in this instrument, for enduring 
judicial independence as: (i) A transparent, merits-based appointment 
                                                 
31
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; (ii) Security of Tenure – that judges cannot be easily or arbitrarily 
removed, to ensure they are not vulnerable to internal or external pressures 
in their consideration of cases
37
; and (iii) Adequate financing – ensuring 
adequate remuneration, conditions of service, pensions etc. This is to attract 
and retain the most qualified and capable candidates, and protect against 
corruption. These must also have adequate legal resources, „basic legal 





1.4.2 Judicial Accountability 
In terms of judicial accountability, not only must courts remain independent 
to fulfil their role of restraining executive power, but they must also act as 
legislators „in their interpretation, application, and, principally in common 
law jurisdictions, creation of legal rules‟.
39
 But these powers are only tenable 
if the judiciary is held in some way accountable or answerable for them.  
 
Therefore, judicial accountability „permits the appropriate and legitimate 
exercise of the legislative function of the judiciary in balance with its role of 
independence‟.
40
 Judicial accountability should ensure that certain 
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 Trebilcock and Daniels op cit note 31 at 59. 
41
 Ndulo and Duthie op cit note 31 at 254. 
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It has been pointed out that it remains „difficult, if not impossible‟ to classify 
an „accepted gold standard‟ of the judiciary.
42
 It has been argued that 
accountability can strengthen the independence of the judiciary, as it „may 
reduce the judiciary‟s vulnerability to external pressures‟.
43
  The Beijing 
Principles in Articles 23 – 28 state that „Judges should be subject to removal 
from office only for proved incapacity, conviction of a crime, or conduct 
which makes that judge unfit to be a judge‟.
44
 The judging of such unfitness 
requires a public hearing, subject to independent review.  
 
Trebilcock and Daniels define three types of judicial accountability: (i) 
Operational Accountability; (ii) Decisional Accountability and; (iii) 
Behavioural Accountability. Operational requires transparency with case-
management, budgetary concerns and that judges should not have too much 
power to negotiate with parties about course, timing, and scope of pre- and 
post-trial litigation.
45
 Decisional Accountability requires a certain quality of 
decisions rendered, as well as quality of reasoning used for them. It requires 
some form (in the least) of a decision-making review mechanism (either like 
a constitutional court or multi-level court approach).
46
 And finally, 
Behavioural Accountability requires answerability for dereliction of duty, 
misuse of office, undignified behaviour, bias or pre-judgment, harmful or 
offensive conduct or disrespect for the law.
47
 Either judges higher up in the 
judicial hierarchy are traditionally responsible for this, or there is an external 
institution such as a judicial ombudsman or council. The authors also point 
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out that in terms of Behavioural Accountability a broad consensus of the 




1.4.3 Judicial Legitimacy 
Legitimacy of a state institution refers to the level of civic trust it enjoys.
49
 If 
there is a legacy of serious abuse, this will have severely undermined the 
legitimacy of an institution.
50
 Successful judicial reform requires that the 
public accepts the judicial institution. Courts hold much power in society, 
and it is critical that the public trusts and has confidence in the courts to 
respect and abide by their decisions.
51
 If this trust or confidence is broken, 
re-establishing it may be difficult.
52
 Rebuilding the integrity of the judiciary 
may not be enough. Efforts such as „verbal and symbolic measures such as 
memorials, apologies, and changing insignia that reaffirm a commitment to 




1.4.4 Other necessary objectives for judicial reform efforts 
Ndulo and Duthie also elaborate on the elements that they believe are 
essential for successful judicial reform. They are in agreement with the three 
key elements (as explained above). They argue that in addition to these there 
should also be: (i) a fully representative judicial body (that all persons are 




 Lauren Davis „Justice-sensitive Security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‟ 
International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009), available at 
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represented, therefore to have a judiciary from a wide range of backgrounds, 
as well as gender equality); (ii) an oversight institution or body (to ensure 
human rights protection, good governance and accountability (for example: 
a Human Rights Commission or Ombudsman); (iii) gender sensitivity 
(ensure a legal system provides accessible and gender-sensitive assistance to 
women in terms of human rights violations, sexual and violent crimes, and 
traditional and customary law aspects); and (iv) access to justice (increased 
access to the courts and agencies charged with human rights protection by 




Another important component to consider would be the restoration of the 
integrity of the judiciary. Many times in post-authoritarian or post-conflict 
states the actual integrity of the judiciary has been compromised by too close 
an association with the previous regime, or by them playing a role in that 
regime‟s oppression of its citizens. Therefore there should be a focus on 
restoring the integrity of the judiciary in such states.  This concept overlaps 
with, and is part of many other goals of the judicial reform process.  
Integrity is defined as „the quality of being honest and having strong moral 
principles‟.
55
 The integrity of a judicial institution refers to it cultivating the 
ethos of the principles of the Rule of Law.
56
 This may be achieved through 
the ensuring of judicial accountability, as well as establishing codes of 
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1.5 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
 
It is now important to establish which mechanisms can actually be used to 
confront the unjust past record of judiciaries in post-authoritarian and post-
conflict states. In real-life examples, transitional justice mechanisms have 
been used to address the unjust past record of judiciaries in such contexts. 
 
The definition of „transitional justice‟, as stated by the UN Security Council 
in their Report by the Secretary General entitled „The Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict societies‟ is: 
 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society‟s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 





A UN Security Council report defines transitional justice mechanisms as: 
 
either judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of 
international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, 








 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights „The Rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies‟ available at http://daccess-dds 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?,OpenElement accessed on  16 May 2012. 
59
 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights „The rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies‟  available at http://daccess-dds 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement , accessed on 16 May 2012. 
23 
 
Essentially, Transitional Justice efforts have two main aims: (1) to address 
the human rights violations of the previous regime (to provide justice to the 
victims, and eliminate a culture of impunity); and (2) to build peace through 
reforming abusive state institutions and promoting reconciliation.
60
 The 
second aim is relevant for the purposes of this dissertation. 
 
When it comes to reforming abusive state institutions, institutional reform 
can be viewed in two contexts. The first context refers to reform efforts that 
seek to establish the regulations and procedures for addressing the past 
human rights violations.
61
 The second context refers to reform efforts that 
seek to improve these institutions in terms of preventing or managing 
conflicts within society and being more accountable in the future. This is to 
prevent the human rights violations from happening again.
62
 These two 
contexts work together simultaneously. If these regulations and procedures 
are established to understand and address past violations and injustices, the 
re-occurrence of such violations and injustices can be prevented in the 
future. 
 
The main premise behind using transitional justice mechanisms to help 
facilitate the reform of formerly abusive institutions is not to see this abusive 
past as a „structural deficit‟ to achieving objectives in the present.
63
 Focus 
should not be placed solely on achieving accountability, transparency and 
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 Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Roger Duthie „Enhancing Justice and Development through Justice-
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legitimacy for these institutions in the present and future, but also placed on 
dealing with why these objectives were absent in the past.
64
 Instead of 
attempting to start from a clean slate and viewing the confrontation of an 
abusive past of a particular institution as a „waste of resources‟, this abusive 
past should be seen as a tool to aid reform efforts of these institutions to 
achieve their goals.  
 
Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie refer to this as a „justice sensitive‟ approach to 
reform efforts of judicial or security sector institutions. 
65
 The essence of this 
argument is that there will be consequences if past abuses, or involvement of 
a state institution in the previous regime‟s oppression of its citizens go 
ignored. These consequences could be that the legitimacy of the reformed 
institution in the post-authoritarian or post-conflict state, as well as chances 
of preventing re-occurrence of such abuses, are compromised.
66
 Therefore, if 
a „justice sensitive‟ approach is taken with reform efforts, such an approach 
will aim to establish accountability not only for present and future abuses 
but for past abuses as well.
67
 A link is seen between establishing 
accountability of an institution for past abuses, and strengthening and 
ensuring accountability of the same institution in the future.  
 
If accountability for past abuses of an institution is found in post-
authoritarian and post-conflict states, this can give greater currency to the 
newly reformed judicial and other institutions, and ensure the further 
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accountability of these bodies in the future. 
68
 Addressing the past record of 
judicial and other institutions in reform efforts can help to build the integrity 
of the institution, confirm its legitimacy, or empower state citizens to see 




Hence, if transitional justice mechanisms can be used to aid the reform 
efforts of certain institutions by understanding and addressing past 
injustices, all these aforementioned objectives may possibly be achieved.  
 
1.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The following country-specific discussions of South Africa and Kenya will 
therefore take place within the following analytical framework. It will be 
assessed, according to the objectives of judicial reform, to what extent the 
use of transitional justice mechanisms has contributed to judicial reform 
efforts in these cases. If these contributions are of a great or significant 
extent, then it can be concluded that it is important for the future 
development of legal systems in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states to 
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TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND JUDICIAL VETTING 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical analysis of how the use of the transitional 
justice mechanisms of truth commissions and vetting can contribute to 
achieving the objectives of judicial reform in post-authoritarian or post-
conflict states.  
 
2.1 TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
 
2.1.1 Definition and purpose of a truth commission 
The UN Security Council report defines „truth commissions‟ as: 
 
official, temporary, non-judicial fact finding bodies that investigate a 
pattern of abuses of human rights or humanitarian law committed over a 
number of years. These bodies take a victim-centred approach and 





Cobián and Reátegui argue that truth commissions enable „the record to be 
set straight‟ and promote the acknowledgement of the abuses and social 
recognition for the abused.
71
 Their view is that recovering the truth of what 
really happened 
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serves as a cornerstone of justice and a triggering device for legal justice, 
reparations, and institutional reforms aimed at preventing massive abuses 




This approach emphasises that not only justice for past crimes may be 
reached by a truth commission, but also the deactivation of the „political, 





Cobián and Reátegui point out that truth commissions can be the perfect 
avenue to affect such a „deactivation‟. This is because a truth commission 
process would have the weight of the new political order behind it and in a 





Ndulo and Duthie agree with this as they believe that truth commissions, in 
particular, could contribute to the development of a state‟s legal 
infrastructure and re-establishment of the Rule of Law in several ways. 
These include revealing the role of the judicial system in past abuses and 
exposing compromised personnel, making specific recommendations to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of the judiciary, promoting the Rule of 
Law by helping to fulfil international legal obligations, promoting a richer 
understanding of the Rule of Law, stimulating debates about what 
constitutes a „good society‟, and promoting trust in the institutions of the 
judicial system.
75
 Therefore, understanding and addressing the unjust past 
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record of a judiciary via a truth commission could help to install a new 
political culture and entrench the Rule of Law substantively in the new 
judicial institution. 
 
2.1.2 The different types of ‘truth’ that can be ascertained 
It needs to be discussed how, by understanding and addressing the „truth‟ of 
an abusive past institution‟s record, it can help to reform it. This depends on 
what type of „truth‟ is established. Chapman and Ball in their article, „Levels 
of Truth: Macro-Truth and the TRC‟, assert that there are two different types 
of „truths‟ that a truth commission could be mandated to find. There is the 
„macro-truth‟ which they define as „the assessment of contexts, causes, and 
patterns of human rights violations‟.
76
 The type of accountability this type of 
„truth‟ seeks to determine is „a framework of understanding the structural 
causes of violence leading to an identification of the broader cause and 




Then there is the „micro-truth‟ which is the „specifics of particular events, 
cases, and people‟.
78
 The type of accountability the „micro-truth‟ establishes 
is „the circumstances and the identification of the individuals, groups, or the 




Chapman and Ball explain that often truth commissions miss the „bigger 
picture‟. Whilst it is important for victims to identify their perpetrators and 
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detail their abuse, it is also important for them to understand „the context and 
causes of these crimes in order to place them in a broader context‟.
80
 They 
are of the opinion that to do this a truth commission „needs to assess how an 
entire legal, ideological, political, and military system was responsible for 




It is the establishment of this „macro-truth‟ by a truth commission which 
would be useful to helping achieve judicial reform. This „macro-truth‟ would 
help identify the causes and provide a framework for understanding what 
went wrong, and caused the breakdown of the Rule of Law. It is important 
not to view the process of a truth commission as a form of trial, where no 
perpetrators are punished for their improper conduct. Rather truth 
commissions should be seen as a forum, within which the causes of the 
human rights violations and abuses can be understood and addressed. This 
would help to prevent the human rights violations and abuses committed by 
a specific institution from re-occurring.  
 
2.1.3 Acknowledgement and Reconciliation 
Truth commissions do not seek to punish those responsible for atrocities 
committed (and indeed do not have the authority to do so), but rather to 
achieve healing and reconciliation on an individual or national level. 
„National Reconciliation‟ is achieved when „societal and political processes 
function and develop without reverting to previous patterns or the 











 To achieve this and help understand and address 
the legacy of an abusive judicial institution, a certain amount of participation 
in the establishment of the „truth‟ or narrative by those responsible would be 
encouraged.  
 
Chapman discusses in her article, „Truth recovery through the TRC‟s 
institutional hearings process‟, that: 
 
Reconciliation in post-conflict societies requires the open and shared 
acknowledgement of the injuries suffered and losses experienced, 
preferably accompanied by the willingness of those responsible to take 




She then quotes John Lederach who declared: 
 
„Acknowledgement is decisive in the reconciliation dynamic. It is one 





To explain or deviate into the psychology behind this, Montville (an 
experienced practitioner and theorist in political conflict resolution) argues 
in his article, „The healing function in political conflict resolution‟, that the 
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He is convinced that healing and reconciliation in ethnic or religious 
conflicts depends on a reciprocal exchange of contrition and forgiveness 
between aggressors and victims.
86
 This process is an indispensable requisite 
for the forging of a new relationship between the parties, based on 
acceptance and reasonable trust.
87
 This process depends on a „joint analysis 
of the history of the conflict, recognition of injustices and resulting historic 




In his discussion of the importance of acknowledgement in this process 
Montville points out that it is often said that the opposite of love is not hate, 
but indifference.
89
 Acknowledgment by the responsible party or institution 
of the injustices committed and their responsibility for these where due, is 
important. It confirms to the victims or sufferers that they are people with 
values and valued and unique identities. 
90
 It is an important step in 
establishing a working trust between the parties to the conflict. 
 
If a truth commission is used in such a manner to understand and address the 
past historical record of the judicial institution, such a mechanism could help 
achieve certain objectives of judicial reform. Some form of 
acknowledgement, from the members of the relevant judiciary which has an 
unjust past record, of the role they played would be required for such a 
process to work. Participation from both sides in the truth commission 
process (those victimised and those responsible) could help legitimise the 
new judicial institution. A truth commission could assist in renewing civic 













trust in the judiciary, restoring the judiciary‟s compromised integrity, and 




Duthie defines vetting as a process: 
 
aimed at screening public employees or candidates for public employment 
to determine if their prior conduct (including, most importantly from a 
transitional justice perspective, their respect for human rights standards) 




This screening process may apply to screening current employees in an 
institution, and if their conduct does not meet applicable standards this could 
result in termination of their employment. It also applies to criteria to 




De Greiff maintains that there have been efforts to distinguish vetting 
processes from mass summary dismissals or purges of public institutions.
93
 
They should be differentiated rather not because of the numerical quantity of 
dismissals that occur, but because of the different criteria used for vetting.
94
 
Vetting relates to processes where the criterion for assessment is based on 
individual behaviour or conduct, which calls for individual review.
95
 Mere 
membership of an organisation or political party is not a primary ground for 
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dismissal in a vetting process, but rather conditions relating to specific 




Vetting is a non-criminal sanctioning mechanism that is important as it 
ensures that even though individuals who are responsible for past abuses will 
not be criminally prosecuted, such individuals are at least excluded from 
public service.
97
 In post-authoritarian or post-conflict situations, large scale 
obstacles often prevent the criminal prosecution of many abusers. Therefore, 
the possibility that they may no longer be employed provides a punitive 
sanction for their past abuses, as well as illustrating to the victims of abuse 
that the state recognises the harm they suffered at the hands of these people. 
For the abusers the loss of their income and the public disgrace for the loss 
of their job creates the punitive sanction. 
 
The vetting of past abusers means that an institution is repopulated by 
completely new people. Whilst it serves well as a punitive sanction for past 
abusers, it is also primarily seen as a measure to reform abusive institutions 
(fulfilling the two-fold aims of transitional justice efforts).
98
 If a state retains 
or hires abusive individuals it is unlikely that citizens (especially former 
victims of abuse) would trust the new institution. Citizens would not have 
many reasons to have confidence in the new institution and be able to 
believe that things have changed or that injustices would not continue.
99
 
Therefore, because past perpetrators have been removed from office or have 
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not been allowed to take office, this can help establish civic trust, as well as 
re-legitimising and strengthening the accountability of the reformed 
institutions. 
 
One of the cautions in terms of vetting institutions in post-authoritarian or 
post-conflict situations is that it may eventuate that a large majority of the 
personnel in an institution are dismissed. Then a vacuum of capacity in 
terms of skills, experience and training may be created in the institution that 
was vetted. For that reason a practical balance must be found. A balance 
needs to be found between providing accountability for past abuses and 
preventing their reoccurrence, and the need for skilled and experienced 
personnel to continue to be present in those institutions so that they can still 
function.
100
 Also, it must be ensured that the vetting procedures are done 
according to the rules of due process. If vetting processes are conducted 
unfairly this will severely undermine the re-establishment of the Rule of 




It is therefore emphasised that the nature of the political conflict must be 
carefully considered before vetting is chosen as an option. In some political 
circumstances (such as the South African transition) due to the nature of the 
political settlement, vetting was not considered a viable option. In such 
situations other measures were used to understand and address the past 
legacy of the judicial institution. Whereas in Kenya, it was the specific 
transitional justice mechanism chosen to help facilitate reform within the 
judiciary.  
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2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Ndulo and Duthie emphasise that the most important argument to be made 
on the matter is that the final impact of transitional justice mechanisms will 
be dependent on the other reforms to the judicial system, and other efforts 
related to the Rule of Law reformation and conflict transformation.
102
 Hence, 
it is important that transitional justice mechanisms are used in conjunction 




The next two chapters will evaluate the extent to which the transitional 
justice mechanisms of truth commissions and judicial vetting have 
contributed to achieving the objectives of judicial reform in South Africa 
and Kenya. Such evaluations will prove interesting in order to see how the 
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The purpose of this chapter is to assess the extent to which the TRC Legal 
Hearing contributed towards achieving the objectives of judicial reform in 
post-Apartheid South Africa.  However, it is not possible to assess the extent 
of this contribution without assessing the contributions of the other 
mechanisms used to achieve the objectives of judicial reform in South Africa 
at this time.  
 
Judicial reform efforts in post-Apartheid South Africa must be seen in the 
light of four important mechanisms. These are: (1) The adoption of the 
Interim Constitution
104
 in 1993; (2) The subsequent creation of the 
Constitutional Court („the CC‟), which heard its first case in 1995; (3) The 
adoption of the Final Constitution
105
 in 1996, and (4) the TRC Legal Hearing 
that was held in October of 1996. 
 
Ultimately, the TRC Legal Hearing‟s contribution will be weighed against 
those of the other three, in order to determine the full extent of its 




                                                 
104
 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.  
105
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
37 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Apartheid has been described as 'the most systematic programme of racial 
segregation and oppression that the modern world has seen'.
106
 It was a 
political policy of racial segregation and consequential racial discrimination 
which was embodied in a series of statutes that made up the Apartheid 
legislation.
107
 This legislation was applied and enforced by the courts of law,  
turning the law into an instrument of oppression.
108
 Due to this, the 
judiciary, as a sphere of government, was largely seen by the anti-Apartheid 
forces as being complicit in the Apartheid government‟s oppression of black 
South Africans.
109
 The courts upheld unjust laws that discriminated on racial 
lines and resulted in many violations of fundamental human rights.
110
 Rule 
by law certainly existed, but the Rule of Law had been severely eroded. 
 
During this time the South African judiciary was almost exclusively white, 
male and conservative (with some notable exceptions).
111
 In terms of the 
selection of judges, political considerations played an important part of the 
process.
112
 There was definitely a history of political appointments to ensure 
compliance with the views of the executive.
113
 Therefore, at the advent of 
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democracy in 1994, it was clear that reform of the judiciary was of vital 
importance.  
 
3.3 THE DECISION MADE AGAINST THE VETTING OF THE 
APARTHEID JUDICIARY 
  
It is important to remember that in South Africa prior to the 1994 transition, 
„political institutions were relatively well established (despite their 
exclusionary nature), civil society was strong, and local technical and legal 
capacity was highly developed.‟
114
As a result, the legal capacity of South 
African courts had been highly developed during Apartheid times and post-
Apartheid judicial reform efforts would therefore not have to focus on 
rebuilding an entire legal system. As the courts remained intact with a 
competent functioning capacity, the question arose of what would become of 
the judges remaining in office from the Apartheid regime.  
 
Corder wrote of the matter: 
 
The options were clear: retain them all; dismiss them all; reappoint them 
all, subject to a formal process; or dismiss them all, requiring those who 
wished to serve the future state to apply for reappointment according to the 




However, the question remained as to which option should be taken. During 
the negotiations for the creation of the CC, certain things became clear to the 
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   It was clear that whilst the new legislative and 
executive spheres of government would largely consist of different people, 
the judicial sphere would probably continue to be dominated (at least 
initially) by the same people as before.
117
   
 
South Africa‟s democratic transition in 1994 was a product of political 
compromise, because by 1990 the Apartheid system could neither be 
sustained by the Apartheid government nor defeated by anti-Apartheid 
forces.
118
 Therefore, in the negotiated political settlement, concessions were 
made on both sides. Both the NP and ANC had reasons to protect certain 
members of their organisations from possible legal prosecutions that could 
arise from certain conduct during Apartheid.
119
 This resulted in the passage 
occasionally referred to as the „postamble‟ to the Interim Constitution.
120
 
This ensured that a mechanism for amnesty in respect of „acts, omissions 
and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the 
course of the conflicts of the past‟ was provided for.
121
 In the TRC‟s final 
report (Volume 5) it detailed that „lustration‟ was not appropriate in a South 
African context.
122
 Therefore, the TRC chose specifically not to recommend 
the disqualification or removal from public office of those responsible for 
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It is ventured that it was government policy during the transition for the 
„postamble‟ in the Interim Constitution not only to provide amnesty from 
civil or criminal actions, but from any possible vetting processes as well.
124
 
Also, due to the strong legal position created by the newly formulated Bill of 
Rights, other constitutional mechanisms and strong labour law regulations, it 




The main point to take from this is that it was obvious that vetting of the 
remaining judges from the Apartheid era was a „clear political nonstarter‟.
126
 
Therefore, the judges of the Supreme Courts and the Appellate Division 
were allowed to continue in office.
127
 The main reasons for this decision 
(apart from the fact that any vetting procedure was not an option) were the 
requirements of political continuity and practicality. 
 
As part of the negotiated settlement and the need for as peaceful a transition 
to power as possible, there was a need for some semblance of political 
continuity.
128
 The ANC and other anti-apartheid forces had for decades been 
touted by Apartheid propaganda as communist-inspired and terrorist 
revolutionaries. Therefore, the creation of some form of continuity was a 
crucial element in convincing those who had been in power, and were used 
to being in power, to yield it.
129
 
                                                 
124
 Klaaren op cit note 1 at 155. 
125
 Klaaren op cit note 1 at 157. 
126
 Klaaren op cit note 1 at 159.  
127







Another important fact was that the running of everyday criminal and civil 
trials had to continue.
130
 Therefore, the running of these trials and cases 
could not be suspended until the Judicial Service Commission had had time 
to appoint or re-appoint new judges in the various divisions of the Supreme 
Court. If the judges from the Apartheid era were excluded as eligible 
candidates for the judiciary in the new dispensation, there would only be a 




These factors, as well as the spirit of reconciliation amongst the negotiators, 
contributed to the judges of the Supreme Courts and the Appellate Divisions 
being allowed to continue in office, providing they swore an oath of 
allegiance to the new Constitution.
132
 All the members of the „old‟ judiciary 
subsequently did. Therefore, when the Interim Constitution was adopted in 
December 1993, Section 241 (2), entitled „Transitional arrangements: The 
Judiciary‟, provided that all the judges holding office before the 
commencement of the Interim Constitution would continue to hold office. 
 
Due to this fact, and the fact that vetting had been firmly ruled out as an 
option for dealing with the record of the judiciary under Apartheid, the 
holding of the TRC Legal Hearing was very important.  
 
3.4 THE TRC LEGAL HEARING  
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the cumulative effect of the Legal 
Hearing shall be analysed through a certain lens.  The focus of this lens will 
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be on which members of the judiciary participated in the Legal Hearing, and 
how their participation contributed to achieving the objectives of judicial 
reform in South Africa. The cumulative effect of the Legal Hearing will then 
be weighed against the contributions of the other mechanisms, as discussed 
above.  
 
3.4.1 Background to the Legal Hearing of the TRC 
In 1996 a human rights lawyer by the name of Krish Govender made a 
submission at a TRC Victim Hearing.
133
 In his submission to the TRC he 
named the „victim‟ as „The South African People‟ and the „Nature of the 
Violation‟ as „Injustice under the Apartheid Judiciary‟.
134
 Dyzenhaus 
confirmed that the debate this submission started led to the decision to hold a 




It is important to remember that the Legal Hearing did not form part of the 
Victims‟ Hearings of the TRC, but rather the Institutional Hearings. The 
Institutional Hearings were the TRC‟s major effort to deal with the structural 
elements of the Apartheid system and to assess the context, causes and 





This can be seen in the TRC‟s mandate under Section 3(1) (a) of the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act
137
  that declares: 
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The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts 
and divisions of the past by……establishing as complete a picture as 
possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human 
rights which were committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the 
cut-off date. 
 
Therefore, in order to understand and address the structural elements (and 
ascertain some form of „macro–truth‟) of the Apartheid system, the TRC 
held six institutional hearings with the goal of achieving an understanding of 
the broader institutional context that facilitated or gave rise to the human 
rights violations under Apartheid.
138
 Each sector chosen was selected 
because they had been the subject of accusations of complicity with the 
Apartheid system. The six sectors were the media, business and labour, 





For each of the hearings, the TRC drew up a set of pertinent questions and 
invited all stakeholders from each sector and from all sides of the political 
equation to make oral or written submissions on the questions at hand.
140
 
Participants could, however, be selective as to which of the issues they 
addressed. 
 
In the invitation issued to relevant stakeholders in the legal community, the 
TRC  assured these stakeholders that the purpose of the hearing was not to 
establish individual guilt or responsibility, but to gain a better understanding 
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of the role the Apartheid legal system played in contributing to past human 




The TRC stated that in terms of the institutional hearings it was of crucial 
importance for both „sides‟ to be present, so as to both be able to speak of 




It was clear that many NGO‟s, Human Rights lawyers and activists, and 
individuals and associations from within the legal community that had been 
heavily opposed to Apartheid, would definitely participate. It was, however, 
considered very important that the most senior institution responsible for 
applying Apartheid laws, the judiciary, should participate as well, especially 
given the fact that all of the „old order‟ judiciary had remained in office after 
the transition.  
 
The actual physical participation by members of the judiciary in the Legal 
Hearing was considered so vital that the draft programme issued five days 
before the actual hearing still had members of the judiciary scheduled to 
appear on the first day.
143
 However, no judge from the old order or new 
presented themselves for questioning before the TRC, though some from 
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Both Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Professor Dyzenhaus
145
 deplored the 
non-attendance of the members of the judiciary and the lack of taking or 
acknowledging responsibility for their conduct under Apartheid. At least one 
of the University Law Schools and the press in general also condemned the 




In his opening address to the Commission at the Legal Hearing, Professor 
Dyzenhaus argued that judges from the old order should be present at the 




3.4.2 The Judges’ written submissions to the TRC 
In order to assess the extent of the contribution of the Legal Hearing to 
achieving the objectives of judicial reform, the contents and the authors of 
the judges‟ written submissions to the TRC need to be analysed. 
 
A combination of „old order‟ and „new order‟ judges made written 
submissions. These submissions encompassed a range of opinions on the 
Apartheid legal order, opinions on the TRC process, and varied responses of 
acknowledgement, contrition, and justification towards the conduct of 
members of the judiciary during Apartheid.  
 
Dyzenhaus ventured that due to the physical absence of any „new order 
judges‟ like Justice Mahomed, or „old order judges‟ like Former Chief 
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Justice Corbett at the Legal Hearing, it was „almost inevitable that no judge 




Dyzenhaus wrote of these judges‟ silence in response to the call for their 
accountability: 
 
one can safely venture that many of those judges feel they have nothing to 
apologise for, that they would have attended only if an oral submission 




The first written submission was made by Judge Michael Corbett
150
 (at that 
time Chief Justice) in direct response to Govender‟s Victims‟ Hearing 
contribution. 
151
 Upon analysis of Corbett‟s submission it is clear that he was 
quite defensive about the judiciary‟s record under Apartheid. Corbett 
admitted that it would be „foolish‟ to claim that the courts did all they could 
have done under Apartheid, but that „the broad picture is, in my estimation, a 
favourable one and very different from that portrayed by Mr Govender‟.
152
  
He defended the „bad spots‟ on the judiciary‟s Apartheid record on the 
grounds of the fact that Parliament was supreme, and hence judges were 
bound to interpret the law as they found it.
153
 He felt strongly that judges 
should not have to „account‟ to the TRC on the grounds that it would involve 
„re-trying‟ cases, and therefore be very „impractical‟.
154
 He also felt that any 
type of „accounting‟ to the TRC would severely undermine the 
                                                 
148




 Described by Dyzenhaus as „ one of the few judges of the old era, and one of a small minority in the old 
order Appellate Division, who had consistently displayed his genuine commitment to the rule of law‟.  
151
 Dyzenhaus op cit note 5 at 37. 
152
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission „The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the bench, legal 
practitioners and legal academics: written presentations‟ (1998) 115 SALJ 15 at 18.  
153
Dyzenhaus op cit note 5 at 46.   
154
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission op cit note 152 at 21.  
47 
 
independence of the judiciary, as in his view, members of the judiciary 
should not have to account to parliament or a commission.
155
 Corbett did not 
express any form of apology for judicial conduct under Apartheid. 
 
The next submission made was a joint submission by five judges from the 
old and new order. The judges representing the „new order‟ were: Arthur 
Chaskalson (President of the CC), Ismail Mahomed (Chief Justice), and Pius 
Langa (Deputy President of the CC).
156
  The „old order‟ were represented in 
this submission by H J 0 van Heerden (Deputy Chief Justice), and again 
Michael Corbett (Former Chief Justice).
157
 The contributions of Mahomed 
and Langa were of special importance, as they were submissions from two 
high-ranking black judges. Justice van Heerden‟s contribution was also of 
special relevance, as Dyzenhaus described him as: 
 
 a respected though conservative member of the old order Appellate 







This submission was very important because its contents were legitimised by 
being a combined opinion of both high-ranking new and old order judges. 
This submission offered an institutional analysis of the situation, in that it 
provided an in-depth structural and clinical perspective of the legal system‟s 
and judiciary‟s role in upholding and maintaining the Apartheid system. It 
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embodied the very essence of an official statement by the judiciary of South 
Africa (crafted by old and new order judges, of different backgrounds and 
races) in response to the invitation by the TRC. 
 
This submission presents the opinion that it is important for the purpose of 
the future development of the legal system, to understand the role played by 
the judiciary during the Apartheid regime.
160
  These five judges directly 
acknowledged that the law was one of the main mechanisms by which 
human rights violations occurred under Apartheid.
161
 They also 
acknowledged that more often than not, judges did not adopt statutory 
interpretations that favoured the protection of fundamental human rights.
 162
 
These judges held that this acknowledgement was „pivotal‟ for the future 
development of the legal system.
163
 They believed that it was not „an end in 
itself‟, but a pre-requisite for all judges of the present and future to 




This submission represented a good „macro-historical‟ analysis of the legal 
system and the judiciary‟s role in upholding and maintaining Apartheid, and 
the pivotal nature of this role. However, it is an impersonal submission that 
is devoid of contrition or some form of apology for the judiciary as a whole.  
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The next submission was made by members of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(hereafter referred to as the “SCA‟): Justice J W Smalberger, Justice C T 




Dyzenhaus highlights it is important to note that, although these were all 
„old order judges‟, „none of the judges involved in drafting the Smalberger et 




These judges did not see value in evaluating the role the legal system had 
played in upholding Apartheid and its associated injustices. The tone is 
defensive, with an underlying current of irritation of having been summoned 
in this manner, to confront the past record of the Apartheid judiciary. It must 
be remembered that the Legal Hearing took place approximately three and 
half years after South Africa‟s transition to democracy. Therefore, the stance 
this submission has taken is that due to the adoption of the Constitution and 
the CC, the past has been dealt with and compensated for effectively.  
 
Whilst this submission acknowledged that the Apartheid judiciary‟s record 
was not „perfect‟, it defended the judiciary‟s record on several bases. The 
submission justified the record on the basis that the Apartheid judiciary was 
functioning in an „undemocratic system‟, where Parliament was supreme
167
, 
and that ninety-five percent of the work that judges were exposed to were 
not „racial‟ laws.
168
 This submission rationalised that, despite the 
shortcomings and injustices of the Apartheid system, everyday life had to go 
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 Therefore, even though many judges who took up appointments to the 
bench were at odds with the morals of the political system, if they had 
refused such appointments, total chaos would have reigned and even more 




These judges did concede that the fact that no persons of colour were 
appointed to the Supreme Court was indefensible and regrettable.
171
 These 
judges included themselves amongst those who believed more could, and 
should, have been said and done to prevent the injustices created by 
Apartheid. They were also of the view that the judiciary was not free from 
any blame for the role it played in the period under review, but that the 
substantial contribution it did make during that era should not be denigrated 




Therefore there was acknowledgement of the role that the judiciary played, 
yet no apology or real contrition was expressed. What these judges had 
displayed was deep unwillingness to face up to the past record of the 
judiciary under Apartheid, and when they did face it, they attempted to 
justify and defend that record.  
 
In addition to his contribution to the Chaskalson et al. submission, Justice 
Langa made an individual submission that was personal and moving. 
Amongst many things, he recounted the harshness and injustice of the legal 
system and how the pass-laws severely violated the dignity of black 
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  In direct contrast to the Smalberger et al submission, he believed 
that the restoration of trust by the public in the judiciary was not something 
that could be assumed because of the creation of a new Constitution.
 174
 
Langa believed that a further process had to take place in order to reassure 




Justice WP Schutz, who was appointed to the SCA in 1995, wrote the next 
submission and aligned himself with the Smalberger et al. submission.
 176
  
He felt that further investigation into the Apartheid Judiciary‟s record would 




Justice Ackermann (who was appointed as a CC Judge in 1994) made a 
more personal submission to the TRC, in which he said he was very moved 
by Langa‟s submission.
178
 He endorsed the Chaskaslon et al. submission as 
well.
179
  Ackermann was a judge from the old order who resigned from the 
bench in 1987 as a matter of conscience, as he had declared that he could no 
longer be a judge in a system that did not treat all human beings as equals.
180
 
In his submission he stated that he believed that in the past he had not done 
enough and he acknowledged and regretted these failures.
181
 He said that he 
wanted to personally apologise for these failures. 
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In another submission, Justice Goldstone (a member of the bench since 
1980) endorsed the Chakaslon et al submission and said he deeply regretted 
that he did not do enough to resist apartheid in his legal career and on the 
bench.
 182
  He gave the submission in order to personally acknowledge the 





Justice Friedman (the then Judge President of Cape High Court) and whom 
Dyzenhaus describes as a „liberal old order judge‟
184
, also gave a 
submission. He provided that, „here it must be acknowledged that by and 




Justice Edwin Cameron (a new order judge under Nelson Mandela, and a 
celebrated human rights lawyer prior to that) also made a submission. He felt 





Two other judges of the old order also gave short submissions to the TRC. 
Justice Eloff, the then Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial Division 
(and an old order judge) aligned himself with Corbett‟s original submission 
and called the TRC Legal Hearing a „meaningless exercise‟.
187
 Judge CS 
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3.4.3 The actual contribution of the TRC Legal Hearing 
Upon analysis of the judges‟ submissions to the TRC, there are two 
opposing schools of thought represented. A clear divide existed between 
those judges who viewed understanding and acknowledging the judiciary‟s 
complicity in Apartheid‟s injustices as useful for the legal system‟s future 
development and those who did not.  
 
There were judges who believed that the adoption of the Constitution and 
the creation of the CC were enough to compensate for the past record of the 
Apartheid judiciary. Thus, directly confronting the past record was 
unnecessary.  
 
However, it is specifically stated by respected sources, (Haysom, Langa and 
Dyzenhaus etc.), that the creation of the Constitution and CC was not 
enough and more had to be done.  
 
It is submitted that neither the forms „acknowledgement‟ present nor the 
judicial participation levels achieved by the judges‟ submissions would be 
sufficient for Montville‟s purposes of achieving some form of political 
reconciliation. Whilst the Legal Hearing did explore the contribution of the 
legal system as a whole to the injustices committed under Apartheid, it can 
barely be described as a „joint analysis‟ of the historical record.  Despite 
these factors, it is still important that the Legal Hearing happened. Although 
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no judges came in person, or no judges who zealously served the Apartheid 
government even gave written submissions, or that within the written 
submissions there was more justification than contrition, the whole process 
was definitely not in vain.  
 
In April of 2010, in celebration of the South African Judiciary being one 
hundred years old, Justices Langa and Cameron wrote a chronology of the 
South African judiciary‟s journey and so addressed the non-appearance of 
the judges at the TRC hearing, by writing: 
 
While the written submissions (including submissions by each of us) had 





They explained the judiciary‟s physical absence by saying many members 
feared participation would be dangerous as at the time a distinct difference 
existed between law and politics, and that the Legal Hearing would be 
„stalking horse‟ for personal scores.
190
 Langa and Cameron wrote that they 
regretted the decision made by leaders of the judiciary not to appear, as: 
 
Their participation [the leaders of the judiciary] would have legitimated 
both the TRC and the judiciary itself. It would have countered the 
perception that judges viewed themselves as somehow separate from and 




Dyzenhaus wrote that whatever level of participation occurred, and however 
imperfect it was, it still contributed to the creation of a historical archive. It 
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did this by telling the story of the Apartheid judiciary‟s contribution (good 
or bad) as a whole and by exposing the „raw pain‟ that had occurred which 
nobody could deny in the future.
192
 He wrote „an archive has an 





Therefore, whilst the Legal Hearing did not achieve its full potential, it did 
create a narrative with some form of participation from both sides of the 
political equation. 
 
This narrative or archive helps one gain an understanding of how the Rule of 
Law deteriorated during Apartheid and how many legal injustices occurred 
(thereby helping restore the Rule of Law). Therefore, it is concluded that the 
TRC Legal Hearing contributed to the re-establishment of the Rule of Law 
on a substantive level. This is because it furthered the understanding of the 
truth of what went wrong under Apartheid, it upped public awareness of the 
subject, stimulated debate, and it compelled some members of the judiciary 
to officially acknowledge, via written statement, the role which the 
Apartheid judiciary played in the past injustices of that time.  
 
3.5 OTHER MECHANISMS THAT HELPED ACHIEVE THE 
OBJECTIVES OF JUDICIAL REFORM  
 
The TRC Legal Hearing occurred last in the sequence of mechanisms that 
mainly contributed to judicial reform efforts in post-Apartheid South Africa. 
The Interim Constitution, the CC and the Final Constitution had all made 
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their mark before the Legal Hearing was held. As can be seen throughout the 
judges‟ submissions to the TRC at the Legal Hearing, some thought that in 
this light, the holding of the Legal Hearing was entirely pointless. In order to 
determine if there is any strength to this argument, the actual extent of the 
Legal Hearing‟s contribution needs to be compared with the contributions of 
the Interim Constitution, the CC and the Final Constitution. 
 
3.6 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
 
South Africa‟s transition to democracy was unique in that the transition of 
power took place within a carefully constructed constitutional framework.
194
 
The Interim Constitution was seen as a „transitional instrument‟ because it 
brought about the demise of the Tri-cameral Constitutional system and the 
Apartheid regime it upheld.
195
 The Interim Constitution accomplished 
several important changes. The first major change that occurred was the 
transforming of South Africa‟s political system from a system of 
parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy, with the 
Constitution becoming the supreme law of the land.
196
 It was now a 
justiciable Constitution which meant that the courts were mandated to 
enforce the Constitution, even to the point of „striking down decisions of the 
democratically elected legislature‟.
197
 The role of the judicial institution in 
South Africa‟s constitutional and political order was also changed.
198
  This 
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change to a system of constitutional supremacy resulted in a shift of power 




3.7 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE CC 
 
Due to the fact that the composition of the South African judiciary was 
going to, at least initially, largely remain unchanged in the new dispensation, 
the creation of the new CC became of utmost importance.
200
 The CC was not 
only envisaged as the „designated guardian, protector, and enforcer of the 
Constitution‟, but also as the „institutional embodiment of South Africa‟s 
new democracy‟.
201
 It also represented a decisive break from the past, not 
only in terms of doctrine, but in terms of its personnel.
202
 At the negotiating 
rounds for the creation of the CC, the anti-Apartheid forces were determined 
that the members of the new CC were at least to be selected and appointed 




During these negotiations, the members of the former Apartheid government 
and judiciary tried to ensure that the power of the old court system was not 
usurped by the creation of this new one. One of the prime issues discussed 
during the CC creation debates was whether the CC would be a separate 
court from the Appellate Division (the former highest court). The Law 
Commission and the Department of Justice (on behalf of the old South 
African government) both favoured the view that the CC should be set up as 
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a fully fledged chamber of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.
204
 
The Department of Justice‟s view was that professional judges from the 
existing Apartheid legal system were more competent than anyone else to be 
appointed as CC judges. If the CC was an additional chamber to the 
Appellate Division, the CC judges should be appointed in the same manner 




The ANC and other progressive organisations, as well as the Technical 
Committee for Constitutional Issues, favoured the idea of the CC being a 




On 12 November 1993 the government and the ANC presented a document 
on Chapter 7 of the Interim Constitution agreed in bilateral talks. This 
document stated that the CC would be a separate court from the Appellate 
Division.
207
 The CC was vested with exclusive constitutional jurisdiction 
over constitutional matters and with the sole power to strike down legislation 





The Appellate Division was afforded no constitutional jurisdiction. 
209
 This 
has been called „an effective sanction for its track record in the protection of 
fundamental rights‟.
210
 The Appellate Division remained the court of final 
                                                 
204




 Spitz and Chaskalson op cit note 201 at 193. 
207
 Spitz and Chaskalson op cit note 201 at 197. 
208




 Corder Judicial Authority op cit note 6 at 260.  
59 
 







 wrote in an article entitled „A Constitutional Court for South 
Africa‟ published in 1991, that the CC is  the foremost guardian of the 
Constitution.
213
  It symbolises a clean break from the past, and creates a 
distance from the previous political order. 
214
 He noted that in other post-
authoritarian states that had created Constitutional Courts in their new 
democracies (for example Germany, Spain and Italy), much caution was 
taken when judicial appointments were made for these new Constitutional 
Courts.
215
 These states had to be careful that there were no suspicions of any 
links between the roles that any judges appointed played under the previous 
despotic dictatorships and the roles these judges played in the new 
Constitutional Courts.
216
 Interestingly though, it is ventured that this is not 
nearly as important a factor in terms of the adjudication of non-constitutional 
matters.
217
 The CC, therefore, should be a factor of unity and not discord and 
division in the new South Africa. In summary, Haysom felt that the creation 
of the CC would be able to reform the prevailing inadequacies of the current 
legal system, by „allowing for more appropriate appointments, a more 
representative bench‟. 
218
 As a result of this, a bench would exist that was 
„better equipped to foster and develop a human rights culture‟.
219
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From the start, the CC was a firm catalyst for judicial reform efforts and 
„reflected a new direction for the judiciary‟. 
221
 Judicial appointments to the 
CC started the process of personnel turnover that would slowly transform the 
composition of the judiciary.
223
  
The eleven members of the CC were finalised in mid-October of 1994. This 
Bench was far more representative in terms of race, gender and life 
experience.
224
 Arthur Chaskalson (a celebrated human rights lawyer and 
ANC sympathiser) was appointed by President Mandela (upon consultation 
with his Cabinet and the then Chief Justice Corbett), as President of the 
CC.
225
 Four of the judges had to be appointed from amongst the ranks of 
existing Supreme Court judges.
226
 The other six appointments were made by 
the President in consultation with the Cabinet, and after consultation with 
the President of the CC, from a list prepared by the Judicial Services 
Commission (discussed in more detail under the next heading).
227
 The 
Judicial Service Commission tendered its list of candidates after a vigorous 
round of public interviews.
228
 The four Justices chosen from the ranks of the 
Supreme Court were Ackermann, Goldstone, Madala and Mahomed.
229
 The 
Justices chosen from the JSC‟s list were Didcott, Kriegler, Langa, Mokgoro, 
O‟Regan and Sachs.
230
 It appeared that no judges who were very 
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In terms of the Final Constitution, certain changes were made to the 
jurisdiction of the CC. This was to account for the fact that it was proving 




In terms of the Final Constitution, the CC now shares much of its previously 
exclusive constitutional jurisdiction with the SCA and High Courts. It acts as 
a court of exclusive jurisdiction to the certain subject-matters of 
constitutional disputes between organs of state or national and provincial 
governments; disputes over constitutionality of provincial or Parliamentary 
bills; determining whether Parliament or the President has failed to comply 
with their constitutional duty; and the certification of provincial 
constitutions.
233
 The CC also hears appeals from other courts concerning 
constitutional and other issues. Due to the Seventeenth Constitutional 
Amendment
234
 promulgated in February of 2013, the ambit of the CC‟s 
jurisdiction has increased. Section 167(3) of the Constitution has been 
substituted with the following provision: 
 
(3) The Constitutional Court – 
(a) is the highest court [in all constitutional matters] of the Republic; 
And  
(b) may decide [only] – 
(i) constitutional matters [ and issues connected with decisions on 
constitutional matters]; and  
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(ii) any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on    
the grounds that the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public 
importance which ought to be considered by the Court; and 
 
(c) makes the final decision whether a matter is [a constitutional matter or 
whether an issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter] 
within its jurisdiction. 
 
Therefore the CC can now function as a court of general jurisdiction in the 
circumstances as referred to in Section 167(3) (b) (ii).  
 
Section 167 (5) of the Final Constitution requires that any order made by any 
of the High Courts of the SCA on whether any Act of Parliament, or 
Provincial Act, or conduct of the President is invalid will only have force 
when that order is confirmed by the CC.
235
 
The CC has been seen as a „crown jewel‟ of the new court system and 
constitutional dispensation. In the CC‟s first judgment of S v 
Makwanyane
236
, it dismantled one of the most harrowing and controversial 
trademarks of Apartheid, the death penalty.
237
 This decision showed 
immediately that the new CC would play an important role in the new South 
Africa by adjudicating upon issues that had political, social and economic 
consequences, as well as legal ones.  
However, the attainment of all hopes and goals in the arena of judicial 
reform could not be achieved by the creation of one new court alone. 
Haysom quoted Johan van der Westhuisen saying that, „a Constitutional 
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237
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Court cannot save a nation without a will to be democratic‟.
238
 It was simply 
not enough to hold a seriously divided society together. Therefore according 
to Haysom, the mere creation of a new CC for South Africa was not enough 
to compensate entirely for the legal injustices that had occurred during the 
Apartheid era.  
3.8 THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FINAL CONSTITUTION 
 
The Final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was first adopted by 
the Constitutional Assembly on 8
 
May 1996 and was signed into law on 10
 
December 1996. This document was instrumental for the reformation of the 
judiciary.  Its adoption was of vital importance for achieving the objectives 
of judicial reform in South Africa as discussed below.  
3.8.1 The principles of the Rule of Law, Separation of Powers, and Judicial 
Independence  
The principles of the Rule of Law, Separation of Powers, and Judicial 
Independence are all enshrined in the Final Constitution. The Rule of Law is 
one of the founding provisions of the Final Constitution.
239
 
The principle of the Separation of Powers was enshrined specifically in 
Constitutional Principle VI of the Interim Constitution. This principle is not 
specifically stated as such in the Final Constitution, but is recognised under 
various provisions: Section 165 vests the judicial authority in the courts; 
Sections 85 and 125 vest the executive authority on a national level to the 
President and on a provincial level to the Premiers; Section 43 vests the 
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legislative authority on a national level to Parliament and on a provincial 
level to Provincial legislatures.
240
 
The principle of judicial independence is guaranteed by various provisions 
in the Final Constitution. Section 165 of the Constitution provides that „The 
courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, 
which they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice‟.  
The section further supplies that no person or organ of state may interfere 
with the functioning of the courts.  
 
Having these principles entrenched as fundamental by the Final Constitution 
has contributed to achieving these objectives of judicial reform efforts. 
 
3.8.2 The Judicial Service Commission 
Under the Apartheid regime the executive had distinctive control over the 
appointment of Supreme Court judges, as the Supreme Court judges were 
appointed by the President acting on the advice of the cabinet.
241
  During the 
negotiations for the creation of the CC, the Technical Committee had 
proposed that an all-party parliamentary committee, chosen from amongst 
members of the newly elected Legislature, should be selected.
 242
   
 
This parliamentary committee would assist in the appointment of CC judges. 
Both the ANC and the NP government had, however, objected to this 
proposal because they wished for the practice of executive appointment of 
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 This previous appointment procedure had obviously 
not been successful due to there being a history of political factors favoured 




Therefore, as provided for in the Interim Constitution and confirmed by the 
Final Constitution, the appointment of judges no longer remains solely in the 
hands of the executive. Now it is a participatory process that involves the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC). In terms of composition, the twenty-
three members of the JSC consist of ten members of Parliament, the Minister 
of Justice, four members appointed by the President (after consulting with 
leaders of the political parties in the National Assembly), and the remaining 




As per Section 174(3) of the Constitution: 
 
The President as head of the national executive, after consulting the 
Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of parties represented in the 
National Assembly, appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief 
Justice and, after consulting the Judicial Service Commission, appoints the 
President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
In terms of appointing judges to the CC, the JSC draws up a list of possible 
choices (the list must comprise of three more names than number of posts to 
be filled).
246
 Should the President consider the nominees unacceptable, 
he/she may (whilst providing reasons) request the JSC to supplement the 
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 After consulting with the Cabinet, the Chief Justice, and leaders of the 





After consulting with the JSC, the President also appoints the President and 
Deputy President of the SCA. Other judges of the superior courts (SCA and 
High Courts) are chosen on the basis of recommendations made by the JSC. 
The President is bound to accept the JSC‟s recommendations for the 
appointments and therefore does not have control over appointments of 
superior court judges. 
249
 The public may attend the interviews of nominees 
by the JSC, but they cannot participate in the choosing of who becomes a 
new judge.
250
 Therefore, the appointment of judges is now open and 




In its functions as described above, the JSC can be seen as a „personnel-
selection institution‟ of sorts, as it has played a vitally important role in 





Clearly, the selection criteria the JSC follow to recommend nominees for 
appointment is very important. Section 174 (2) of the Final Constitution 
provides that:  
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The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender 
composition of South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are 
appointed.  
 
One no longer has to be a practising advocate (though this is the norm) to be 
considered eligible to be a judge. Section 174 provides that „any 
appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper person may be 
appointed as a judicial officer‟.  However, any person to be appointed to the 
CC must also be a South African citizen. Such measures have been created 
so as to widen the pool of eligible candidates for judicial appointments from 
ranks such as experienced and senior attorneys, legal academics and 
magistrates. 
 
Clearly, it is important to transform the judiciary from a race and gender 
perspective, yet the quality of the judicial candidates selected is very 
important too (especially for purposes of judicial reform, and maintaining 
the Rule of Law).  
 
Firstly, candidates recommended for appointment must have the capability 
and skills to perform judicial functions. It has „almost hardened into a rule‟ 
that candidates should have acted preferably (though not imperatively) in the 
Division within which they seek appointment.
253
 This will demonstrate to 
the JSC whether they have the necessary motivation and industry to dispense 
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Secondly, no matter the candidate‟s race or gender, they must have a certain 
mind set and possess certain attributes.
255
  They must: 
 
demonstrate a commitment to the values that underpin the Constitution, 
such as respect for the human dignity of each and every person, the 
achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms, 





This determination will be made upon the JSC considering the candidate‟s 
Curriculum Vitae, comments received about the candidate from professional 
and other bodies, judgments they have made or publications they have 
written, the candidate‟s reputation within their profession, and how they 




The JSC will also consider the symbolic value of a specific recommendation 
for appointment. Hence, if a specific candidate‟s recommendation would 
give a very positive message to a certain community at large, this may prove 




As per its constitutional mandate the JSC has played a large role in re-
staffing the judiciary in the post-Apartheid era, in terms of a gradual 
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The creation of the JSC has therefore contributed to achieving judicial 
independence, by taking the power of making judicial appointments away 
from the exclusive domain of the executive. The fact that it is now a more 
transparent and merit-based appointment system has also helped strengthen 
the independence of the judiciary.  The JSC has also been instrumental in 
transforming the bench to be more reflective of South African society from a 
race and gender perspective.  
 
3.8.3 Employment conditions of the judiciary 
As part of a longer statement, Sawant J of the Supreme Court of India 
pointed out that:  
 
Judicial independence cannot be secured by making mere solemn 





The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
261
 
make it very clear that the principles of security of tenure, as well as 
adequate financing for the Judiciary, are vital to ensure judicial 
independence.   
 
These principles are addressed in the South African context by Section 177 
of the Final Constitution. As per Section 177, it is very difficult to remove a 
judge from office.  
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A judge may only be removed on grounds of incapacity, gross misconduct or 
incompetence.
262
 The JSC must establish these grounds and a resolution 
calling for that judge‟s removal based on these grounds must be approved by 
two-thirds of the National Assembly. When this resolution has been adopted, 
the President must remove the judge from office.  
 
Therefore the JSC, once again, plays a vitally important role in ensuring the 
Behavioural Accountability of members of the judiciary. Any complaints of 
judicial misconduct, incapacity, or incompetence must be raised with the 
JSC.   
 
In terms of actually holding office, the principle applied is that of „once a 
judge, always a judge‟, and judges receive a monthly salary from when they 
start working as judges until death.
263
 Upon a judge‟s death, this salary is 
translated into a pension for that judge‟s surviving spouse or partner. Section 
176 (3) of the Constitution provides that a judge‟s salary, allowances and 
benefits may not be reduced. The Judges‟ Remuneration and Conditions of 
Employment Act
264




Therefore, it seems that in the South African context judges enjoy relative 
security of tenure and adequate financing in terms of salaried and pension 
remuneration. However, an interesting question has been raised by Malcolm 
Wallis (a judge at the SCA). In his article, „Judges Servants of Justice or 
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Civil Servants?‟, Wallis discussed the question of how independent or 




Wallis points out that judges, like all people, have to fill out forms for 
mundane things such as cellular phone contracts or loans. For example, 
when judges have to fill out the „employer section‟, they often, for 
practicalities sake, have to put „The Department of Justice”.
267
 However, to 
emphasise that judges are not employees of the executive, judges‟ salaries 
are excluded from the allocation of funds to government departments. Their 




This distinction is all good and well to make but judges are in actual fact 
entirely dependent on the state in terms of the premises they work at, the 
resources they use, the staff that assist them, how the court budget is 




However, Wallis concluded that a judge is a holder of public office in the 
same way as a member of the legislature and exercises the sovereign judicial 
power of the state.
270
 Judges represent the state and therefore are not 
„employees‟ of the state such as their administrative staff are, nor are judges 




 This is a very important distinction 
to be emphasised for the principle of judicial independence. 
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The criteria of security of tenure and adequate financing for the judiciary are 
accommodated for by South African law, and therefore contribute to 
achieving the objective of judicial independence further.  
 
3.8.4 Civil Liability 
The South African judiciary enjoys limitation of civil liability so that they 
can conduct themselves and perform in their profession safely and without 
unnecessary fear. In terms of the common law as developed in South Africa, 
a judge or magistrate can only be held civilly liable for defamatory remarks 
if it is proved that „he or she made those statements out of personal spite, ill-
will, or an improper, unlawful or ulterior motive‟.
273
 In terms of section 25 
(1) of the Supreme Court Act,
274
 this prohibits the issuing of a civil 
summons or subpoena against a judge without the permission of the court 
out of which the process will be served.
275
 The process is similar in the CC 
as no issuing of a summons or subpoena may occur without the consent of 




3.8.5 Re-structuring of the Court System 
Section 166 of the Final Constitution created a new hierarchy of courts in 
South Africa. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court was replaced by 
the SCA and was no longer a special division of the Supreme Courts but a 
fully fledged entity of its own.
277
 The Final Constitution also created a new 
High Court system, in which each division has a geographical limitation on 













their jurisdiction, usually in line with a Provincial parameter.
278
 These 
Provincial divisions of the High Court were created by amalgamating and re-
structuring the former provincial and local divisions of the former Supreme 
Court and from the variety of superior courts of the former TBVC 
(homeland states). The Magistrates‟ Courts and other lower courts created 




In varying degrees of authority the courts are empowered to enforce the 





Section 172 (2) (a) of the Constitution provides that: 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa or a court 
of similar status may make an order concerning the constitutional validity 
of an Act of Parliament, a Provincial Act or any conduct of the President, 
but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed 
by the CC. 
 
The restructuring of the entire court system, with the CC at the helm, has 
helped achieve the objective of Decisional Accountability. The new court 
hierarchy has created a new decision-making review system that further 
achieves this. The placing of the CC at the helm of this new court system 
also helped legitimise the system in the new constitutional era.  
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3.8.6 The Judicial Oath 
Upon appointment as a judge or an acting judge of the High Courts, SCA 
and CC, such judge must swear an oath of solemn affirmation. This oath as 
set out in 6(1) of schedule 2 of the Final Constitution, provides that the 
judicial officer taking it must be faithful to the Republic of South Africa, 
uphold the Constitution and the human rights entrenched within it, and 
administer justice without discrimination or bias. This oath serves as a 
verbal and symbolic measure to the new constitutional and human rights era. 
The taking of this oath by the members of the Apartheid judiciary remaining 
in office contributed to restoring their integrity, and strengthening the 




Of the four mechanisms that were vital for achieving the objectives of 
judicial reform in South Africa, the cumulative contributions of the Interim 
Constitution, the CC and the Final Constitution were greater than the Legal 
Hearing‟s. These mechanisms (that are to a great extent interwoven and 
interdependent) contributed to achieving the objectives of: judicial 
independence, judicial accountability, judicial legitimacy, and a more 
representative bench in terms of race and gender.   
 
The Legal Hearing succeeded in creating a narrative of the role played by 
Apartheid judiciary in the legal injustices and human rights violations that 
occurred under Apartheid. Weighed cumulatively however, with the 
contributions of the other mechanisms of judicial reform, the extent of the 
Legal Hearing‟s contribution was small. The creation of the CC and the 
75 
 
Interim and Final Constitutions were the real catalysts for change within the 
South African judiciary. Despite this, the Legal Hearing‟s contribution 






























This chapter explores the use of judicial vetting in Kenya in the aftermath of 
the 2007 election violence. The extent to which judicial vetting has 
contributed towards achieving the objectives of judicial reform in Kenya 
will also be assessed. 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Kenya, a former British Colony, gained its independence in 1964.
281
 Kenya 
was declared a one-party state in 1982, but was restored to a multi-party 
democracy in 1991.
282
 Since then violence has been commonplace in most of 
Kenya‟s subsequent elections, except the 2002 elections when Mwai Kibaki 
of the NARC (National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition) party was elected to 
the presidency.
283
 Despite the restoration of a multi-party democracy in 
Kenya in 1991, the Kenyan judiciary enjoyed dwindling public support and 
trust in the later years of the 1990‟s and the early millennium. 
 
Upon analysis it becomes clear that in those years a culture of corruption, 
bribery, selling justice at a price to the highest bidder, favouritism, favours 
and general unethical behaviour had developed within the Kenyan 
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 The previous constitutional order (before the 2010 Constitution 
was adopted) contributed to this.
285
 Successive amendments to the previous 
Constitution meant that the President‟s powers would increase more and 
more rapidly. Hence, as the President gained more control over government 





This is demonstrated in how judges were appointed.
287
 All of the members 
of the Judicial Service Commission were directly or indirectly chosen by the 
President.
288
 The procedure was described by a recent task force assigned to 
report on judicial reform in Kenya, as not being „transparent, competitive, or 




Many of the judges selected were also from other African or Commonwealth 
countries, and were not given permanent positions.
290
 Such judges were 
awarded short-term contracts that had to be renewed every few years. This 
severely compromised the judiciary‟s security of tenure and independence, 
as such judges could have easily been vulnerable to executive pressure or 
external influences.
291
 Such factors meant that judicial officers in such 
positions could have thought it in their best interests to either favour the 
interests or shield the transgressions of the selecting authority.  
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The Chief Justice (the head of the Judiciary) also had wide powers in their 
position such as: 
 
the power to determine which judges hear what cases, where litigants can 
file their cases and how, supervising and disciplining judges and other 
judicial officers, allocation of office space, housing, and cars for judicial 
officers, transferring judicial officers from one geographic station to 




These powers were not regulated or limited and were easily open to abuse. 
The Chief Justice would allocate certain cases to „politically compliant‟ 
magistrates or judges, and if there were those who would not oblige in such 
a manner, they would be intimidated with threats such as a transfer to a 
remote post or dismissal.
293
 The 1963 Constitution of Kenya also awarded 
complete discretion of the appointment or dismissal of the position of Chief 
Justice to the President. Together these factors undermined the legitimacy of 




4.2 THE „RADICAL SURGERY‟  
 
When Kibaki was elected as president of Kenya in 2002, this was the first 
change of government since 1983. One of Kibaki‟s election promises was 
that judicial reform would occur under his rule.
295
  Acting on this promise, 
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Kibaki set up the „Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee‟.
296
 This 





It was on the basis of the findings of this report that a „radical surgery‟ of the 
judiciary occurred. Upon investigation this committee found that there was a 
culture of corruption and bribery within the judiciary, and even listed 
estimates of the amounts payable that would secure a judgment in various 
types of cases.
298
 Once the committee‟s report (known as the Ringera 
Report) was released, it implicated five out of nine Court of Appeal justices, 
eleven out of thirty-six High Court justices, and eighty-two out of two 
hundred and fifty-four magistrates as corrupt.
299
 In October of 2003 a „list of 
shame‟ was published in the media, naming those justices implicated in the 
report. This was before any of those implicated were actually informed of 
the allegations against them.
300
 An ultimatum delivered by the Chief Justice 
followed, providing that all those implicated could either resign, „retire‟ 
quietly within two weeks, or face suspension without pay and a tribunal. 
Within weeks fifteen members of the judiciary had resigned and only seven 
chose to face the tribunal.
301
 This resulted in a very low morale amongst the 




The „radical surgery‟ was largely seen as a failure as it had severely 
compromised the security of tenure of the judiciary and was not done 
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according to the principles of due process. Upon recommendations of the 
Chief Justice, President Kibaki appointed two tribunals staffed entirely of 
members of the Kenyan judiciary (one for the Court of Appeal and one for 
the High Courts), to deal with the judges implicated in corruption.
303
 
Tribunal procedures were complicated and lengthy, often due to the fact that 
the judges facing charges were challenging the legality of the actions taken 
against them.
304
 A huge backlog of cases occurred and did not result in 
public opinion of the judiciary improving.
305
 Another reason for this was that 
the new judges whom President Kibaki chose to replace the old judges 
(dismissed due to the „radical surgery‟) were not hailed as much better than 
their predecessors.
306
 Important sectors of the legal profession were very 
concerned about the lack of appropriate academic qualifications and 
experience of the newly appointed judges.
307
 As one observer commented to 
the researchers from the International Commission of Jurists, „Kenya has 




This precise sentiment was demonstrated fully in the aftermath of the 2007 
election crisis, when public confidence in the judiciary was extremely low 
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4.3 THE 2007 ELECTION CRISIS 
 
Kenya‟s fourth multi-party elections since 1991, a tightly competitive and 
charged affair, saw the incumbent President Kibaki (now of the Party of 
National Unity „PNU”) pitted against Raila Odinga of the Orange 
Democratic Party (the „ODM‟).
310
 Kenya has over seventy distinct ethnic 
groups with the five largest being the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin and 
Kamba.
311
 Since Kenya gained her independence, her elections have been 
dominated by ethnic ties. The ODM was strongly supported by the 
ethnically rooted political constituencies of the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin, 
whereas the PNU was strongly supported by that of the Kikuyu.
312
 During 
the lead up to the elections, opinion polls showed that Odinga maintained a 
slight lead over Kibaki throughout.
313
 On the morning of the 29
th
 of 
December 2007 the Electoral Commission released the voting results of half 
of Kenya‟s constituencies, showing Odinga roughly ahead by just less than 
600,000 votes. However, as the day progressed, the final counting of the 
total presidential vote was delayed and delayed, and notions that fraud was 




The Kenyan Police force and its paramilitary (the General Service Unit) 
moved into the national tallying centre, and all broadcasters and media 
(except the state-controlled Kenyan Broadcasting Association) were told to 
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 In the afternoon of the same day, the Electoral Commission 
announced results that largely dismissed Odinga as having a lead. The next 
day the Electoral Commission announced Kibaki as the winner of the 
presidential elections.
316
 Odinga and his party, the ODM, instantaneously 
rejected the election results, citing that the results were fraudulent and that 
the election had been rigged.
317
 Many foreign election observer missions 
(such as the EU) agreed with them.  
. 
The Chief Justice, Evan Gicheru, acted very inappropriately in the aftermath 
of the disputed election results.
318
 Less than a half hour after the election 
results were announced and night was falling, Gicheru hurriedly swore 
Kibaki in as president in Nairobi State House.
319
  Gicheru‟s presence at the 
ceremony severely shattered the average reasonable and well-informed 
Kenyan citizen‟s trust in the judiciary.
320
 This conduct severely contradicted 
Gicheru‟s judicial oath, and his previous call for increased judicial 
accountability.  
 
Due to this, it became clear that it would be highly unlikely that any judicial 
inquiry into the challenge of the election results would be an impartial 
one.
321
 The ODM saw the Kenyan courts as „instruments of the state‟ that 
clearly would not be able to conduct an unbiased investigation into the 
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 The ODM claimed that the judiciary had already 
been warned by the executive branch of government in advance to dismiss 




Following the announcement of the results and the swearing in of Kibaki as 
president, the country erupted and there were waves of attacks that were 
spontaneous, organized and retaliatory.
324
 The attacks occurred throughout 
January 2008 with,  
 
the reported death of over 1,200 persons, the displacement of over 268, 300 
individuals, and the destruction of over 41,000 houses, the looting of 




The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
mission to Kenya found that a lot of reliable evidence existed, including 
various witness testimonies that Kenyan police had used excessive force to 
deal with the crowd demonstrations.
326
 Many of the Kenyans that this 
Mission spoke to identified a lasting culture of impunity as a large 
contributing factor to the cause of the violence.
327
 There was a general 
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4.4 THE KENYAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION 
FORUM 
 
On 10 January 2008 the PNU and the ODM accepted Kofi Annan
329
 as the 
African Union‟s Chief Mediator.
330
 Annan headed an internal mediation by 
the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities.
331
 This panel, 
also consisting of Benjamin Mkapa and Graca Machel, brought the ODM 
and PNU into the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) 
forum.
332
 The main aim of this political dialogue was „to achieve sustainable 
peace, stability and justice through the Rule of Law and respect for human 
rights‟.
333
   
 
The parties agreed to a four point agenda. The main point for the purposes of 
this discussion was Agenda Item 4. Agenda Item 4 aimed at addressing long-
term issues, including undertaking constitutional, legal and institutional 
reforms; land reform; tackling poverty and inequality as well as combating 
regional development imbalances; tackling unemployment, particularly 
among the youth; consolidating national cohesion and unity; and addressing 
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This panel facilitated the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, and this 
„power-sharing‟ deal was signed by both the PNU and ODM on 28 February 
2008.
335
 Kibaki would be President, with Odinga filling the newly created 
role of Prime Minister.
336
 This agreement details that both parties would 
nominate a deputy Prime Minister. The other ministry portfolios would be 
distributed equally between the two parties. This agreement also made way 
for the establishment of three commissions – the Commission of Inquiry on 
Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 





Items of Agenda Four (as agreed to in the KNDR) would be given special 
attention, as per this agreement the coalition government would work 
together to resolve the identified long-term goals in this agenda.
338
 
Therefore, legal and institutional reforms of government institutions were 
high on the list of the newly formed coalition government‟s priorities.  
 
4.5 CIPEV‟S RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE ICC INVESTIGATION 
IN KENYA 
 
The full CIPEV report on the 2007 election violence included a list of 
persons from the highest levels of government that were believed to be most 
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responsible for the 2007 violence.
339
 CIPEV also recommended that a 
Special Tribunal be set up, comprising of joint Kenyan domestic, African 
regional, and international participation at every level.  
 
However, by 2009 it was clear that legal accountability for the post-election 
violence would not be able to be adjudicated upon in a fair or unbiased 
manner by Kenyan domestic courts.
340
 As Parliament voted against the Bill 
to establish a Special Tribunal and with the clear lack of political will to 
bring legal accountability for the victims of the post-election violence, a lead 




This instance illustrates again how important judicial reform was in Kenya, 
so that the judiciary could again be seen as independent arbiters of justices. 
 
4.6 JUDICIAL REFORM UNDER THE 2010 KENYAN CONSTITUTION 
 
The new Kenyan Constitution, promulgated on the 27
th
 of August 2010, set 
up a critical framework for the realisation of the goals listed in the Items of 
Agenda Four in the KNDR.
342
 As in South Africa‟s case, the process of 
judicial reform in Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis has largely taken 
place within a constitutional framework.  
 
The 2010 Constitution established the Judiciary as a separate entity from the 
Executive. Article 159 (1) stipulates that „Judicial authority is derived from 
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the people and vests in, and shall be exercised by, the courts and tribunals 
established by or under this Constitution‟. Article 159 (2) (a) – (e) provide 
specific guidelines and principles that the courts should follow when 
administering justice. This contributes to further achieving the objective of 
judicial independence, by entrenching the principle of separation of powers 
constitutionally.  
 
Article 171 of the 2010 Constitution establishes the Judicial Service 
Commission (JSC) consisting of eleven members: the Chief Justice, who 
would be the chairperson of the Commission; one Supreme Court judge 
elected by the judges of the Supreme Court; one Court of Appeal judge 
elected by the judges of the Court of Appeal; one High Court judge and one 
magistrate, one a woman and one a man, elected by the members of the 
association of judges and magistrates; the Attorney-General; two advocates, 
one a woman and one a man, each of whom has at least fifteen years‟ 
experience, elected by the members of the statutory body responsible for the 
professional regulation of advocates; one person nominated by the Public 
Service Commission; and one woman and one man to represent the public, 





The President only has the power to appoint judicial officers in the Supreme 
Courts based on the recommendations of the JSC.
344
 Therefore, the creation 
of the JSC has been of vital importance to judicial reform efforts because it 
took away the personal discretion of the President to appoint judicial 
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 It has strengthened the independence of the judiciary by creating 
a more transparent, democratic and merit-based appointment mechanism.   
 
Article 168 (1) deals with the grounds on which  a judge may be removed 
from office  and Article 168 (2) provides that the removal of a judge can 
only be initiated by the JSC (on its own initiative or on the basis of an 
individual‟s complaint). The President will make a final decision based on 
the recommendations of the JSC and of a tribunal consisting of former 
members of the judiciary, an advocate and persons experienced with public 
affairs. Should the judge be suspended until the final decision is taken, they 
will receive half their usual pay until they are released or re-instated. 
Therefore, these provisions have provided the Kenyan judiciary with more 
security of tenure, enshrined principles of due process for disciplinary 
procedures, and curbed the previous powers of the Kenyan President in this 
regard. Behavioural Accountability of members of the judiciary is further 
ensured through this process.  
 
In terms of Article 160(4) of the 2010 Constitution, the remuneration and 
benefits payable to, or in respect of, a judge would not be varied to the 
disadvantage of that judge. The retirement benefits of a retired judge would 
not be varied to their disadvantage during the lifetime of that retired judge.  
In terms of Article 173 (1) a judicial fund was established for administrative 
expenses of the judiciary to be administrated by the Chief Registrar (the 
administrator and accounting officer of the judiciary). Therefore, the 2010 
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Constitution has further enhanced the independence of the judiciary by 
ensuring they have security of tenure, and adequate financing.  
 
The 2010 Constitution has also made specific provision for the 
decentralisation of judicial authority, by restructuring the court system and 
its hierarchy.
346
 Under the new constitutional order, three superior courts 
systems (the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the High Courts) 
were established, with each separate tier having their own Chief Justice 
elected by the judges of that tier.
347
 The original role of Chief Justice still 
exists as head of the entire judiciary, but the position‟s powers are 
circumscribed under the new 2010 Constitution.
348
 The new positions of 
deputy Chief Justice (Deputy of the Judiciary), and Chief Registrar of the 
Judiciary (head administrator and accounting officer of the Judiciary and 




Decisional Accountability is ensured through this decentralisation of power, 
and by the creation of a decision-making review system through having a 
multi-level court approach. Article 159 (2) of the 2010 Constitution also 
requires that the courts and tribunals be guided by certain principles when 
dispensing justice, thereby further ensuring the quality of decisions and 
behaviour of the judiciary. 
 
Thus, the 2010 Kenyan Constitution contributed to achieving certain 
objectives of judicial reform efforts. It really helped achieve the objective of 
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judicial independence in different ways by establishing the judiciary as an 
independent and autonomous institution, which was free from executive 
control. Judicial accountability was also ensured to a much greater extent 
than under the 1962 Constitution.  
 
Yet, before the 2010 Constitution was promulgated, the new Kenyan 
government faced the same dilemma that had arisen in the South African 
context, this dilemma being as to what would be the fate of the judges still 
remaining in office at that time. 
 
4.7 THE VETTING OF JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES 
 
The final decision to vet the judiciary was reported on in the „Final report of 
the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review‟ in October 2010. 
 
There were two clear opinions on the subject. One group felt that all the 
remaining judges should be removed from office once the 2010 Constitution 
was promulgated, but with the option to re-apply and be re-appointed.
350
 The 
other was in favour of a „gentler‟ approach, that the judges remain in office 
and all undergo vetting. It was decided that in the Kenyan context it would 
be „inappropriate‟ to simply allow the remaining judges to continue in office 
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It was decided vetting was the best option to follow, as it would have similar 
results as forcing all members of the judiciary to re-apply but would be less 
problematic.
352
 Before the publishing of the Final Report of the Committee 
of Experts of Constitutional Review, the judges and magistrates (after 
considerable hesitation and suspicion) accepted that the vetting process 




Article 23 (1) of the Sixth Schedule of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
provided that Parliament would enact legislation to establish a Board for the 
vetting of judges and magistrates. 
 
In March 2011 the Kenyan parliament enacted the Vetting of Judges and 
Magistrates Act (the Vetting Act) which established an independent board 




According to its official website the Board‟s main objective is to:  
 
vet the suitability of all the Judges and Magistrates who were in office on 
the effective date of the new constitution of Kenya to continue to serve in 
accordance with the values and principles set out in Articles 10 and 159 of 





The aim of the Board was not to carry out a „purge‟, but to restore the 
public‟s confidence in the judiciary and the courts.
 356
 In order to prevent 
affecting the Rule of Law, events that happened in the „radical surgery‟, and 
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to not go against the principles of due process, the Board must discharge 
their mandate according to the values of teamwork, integrity, respect, 
accountability and transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, and 
professionalism.
357
 If the processes followed by the Board were arbitrary and 
its decisions were not solidly based on material before it, the main goal of 
restoring public confidence in the judiciary would not be achieved.
358
  The 
Board comprised of nine members, six Kenyans
359




   
 
Section 18 of the Vetting Act details the relevant considerations that the 
Board would consider when determining the suitability of the candidate to 
continue being a judicial officer or magistrate under the new 2010 
Constitution. These criteria are: constitutional criteria for appointment; past 
work record, including prior judicial pronouncements; criminal cases or 
prosecutions against the judge or magistrate concerned; and complaints or 
other relevant information received from any person or body, including the 
Law Society of Kenya, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, the 
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The Board would ideally use these criteria to arrive at a fair and appropriate 
determination, once considered in conjunction with the answers and 
impression made by the vetting candidate at their interview. 
 
Section 19 (2) of the Vetting Act provides that all information gathered 
throughout the interview and the consideration process remains confidential. 
Section 19 (3) follows that all candidates who undergo vetting shall be given 
sufficient notice of when the procedure will begin, as well as receiving a 
summary of any complaints  lodged against them. The vetting procedure and 
interviews would also be conducted in private, unless the candidate to be 
vetted requests a public hearing. Section 19 (6) also affirms that all 
proceedings would happen according to principles of natural justice.  
 
Section 21 (1) of the Vetting Act provides that if the Board decides a 
candidate is unsuitable to continue as a judge or magistrate they must inform 
that candidate within thirty days of the determination and specify reasons. 
Once the candidate has been informed of this decision, they are deemed to 
have been removed from office. Section 22 says that the vetted candidate 
would be allowed to request a review from the same panel that made the 
decision, within seven days of being informed of the final decision. The 
decision would be made public. 
 
Sections (2) and (3) of the Vetting Act assert that if a Judge elects to leave 
office voluntarily instead of submitting to vetting procedures or is found 
unsuitable by the vetting board, they will be deemed as qualified for early 
retirement. Therefore, such a judge would be entitled to the terminal benefits 
of early retirement. An important innovation is that all judges and 
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magistrates that would be subject to the vetting procedure would remain in 
office, unless and until they were found unsuitable in terms of the Vetting 
Act.
363
 The judges and magistrates were to be vetted in stages: first the Court 
of Appeal judges, then the High Court judges, with the vetting of the 
Registrar of the High Court, the Chief Court Administrator, Chief 










April 2012 the Board released its first outcome.
365
 The Board 
declared four of Kenya‟s top judges from the Court of Appeal unsuitable to 
continue in office.
366
 Justices Emmanuel Okubasu, Samuel Bosire, Riaga 
Omollo and Joseph Nyamu failed to pass the integrity test. The reasons for 
this determination were that, „it [the first determination] found that some of 
the judges lacked independence, showed bias towards the high and mighty in 
society, favoured impunity and limited democratic expression among 
others‟.
367





 of July 2012 the second determination issued by the Board found 
that Justice Mohammed Ibrahim was unsuitable to continue in office.
368
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Justice Roselyn Naliaka Nambuye was also found to be unsuitable.
369
 
Several other judges were cleared. The four Court of Appeal judges who had 
been declared unsuitable in the first determination had sought a review of 





In the third determination, the Board was reviewing judges holding office in 
the High Courts. In the announcement made on the 3
rd 
of August 2012, only 
one judge, Justice Jeanne Gacheche, was declared unfit to continue in 
office.
371
 Several other High Court judges were declared fit to remain in 
office.  
 
In the fourth determination announced on the 21
st
 of September 2012, 
Justice Joyce Nuku Khaminwa was found unsuitable to remain in office due 
to ill health.
372
 Both Judges Mohammed Ibrahim and Roslyn Nambuye were 
granted review applications of their rulings of unsuitability and were to be 




In the fifth determination announced in December 2012, five High Court 
Judges (Justices Mary Ang‟awa, Leonard Njagi, Joseph Sergon, Nicholas 
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January 2013, the Board 
cleared both Justice Mohammed Ibrahim and Justice Roselyn Naliaka 
Nambuye (both of whom the Board had declared unsuitable in the second 
determination and they had requested a review) as suitable after they both 
underwent a fresh vetting.
375
 However, Judges Muga Apondi and Abida Ali 
Aroni were declared as unfit.  
 
4.9 OPPOSITION TO THE DECISIONS MADE BY THE VETTING 
BOARD 
 
There have been distinct challenges to the process and actual authority of the 
Board to make such decisions concerning the bench‟s composition.  Should 
a party contest the Board‟s decision on the suitability of a judge to serve 
office, they would seek relief in the courts to be granted a review of the 
board‟s decision. This presents a direct conflict of interests, as judges would 
make rulings on the final decision of a body that will ultimately vet those 
judges themselves. Attempts were made to prevent such a conflict. For 
instance, Section 22 (3) of the Vetting Act (which deals with the rights of 
judges declared unfit by the Board to seek a review of that decision) 
provides that „the decision [after determination has been reviewed] by the 
Board under this section shall be final‟. More specifically Section 23 (2) of 
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the Sixth Schedule to the 2010 Kenyan Constitution provides that removal of 
a judge from office by the Vetting Act or any related processes, would not 
be subject to the review of any court. 
 
Despite this ouster clause, legal challenges to the Board‟s decisions have 
still occurred within the courts. 
 
In July 2012, Judge Jeanne Gacheche made an application to the Kenyan 
High Court to stop the proceedings of the Vetting Board. The application 







August 2012, an Eldoret Petition (no. 11 of 2012) was filed by the 
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, Richard Etyan‟ga Omanyala and 
Bishop Francis Ranogwa Ozioya.  Judges Mohammed Ibrahim and Roslyne 
Nambuye were joined as interested parties to the petition.
377
 This petition 
argued that the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act contravened certain 
provisions of the 2010 Constitution, that the proceedings and decisions made 
by the Vetting Board between the 23
rd
 of May 2012 and the 12
th
 of July 2012 




 of September 2012 two petitions were filed by Judges Riaga 
Omolo and Samuel Bosire. These petitions sought to have the vetting 
processes made by the Vetting Board in terms of the initial vetting and 
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2012 which sought, pending the hearing of all the petitions, to have a 
conservatory order declaring that all actions, decisions, processes and events 
consequential upon the findings of the Vetting Board dated the 25
th
 of April 
2012 and the 20
th






of September 2012 a three-judge bench of the High Court ruled 
on the application filed by the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 
Richard Etyan‟ga Omanyala and Bishop Francis Ranogwa Ozioya.
380
  After 
considering all the issues raised by the petition, the court held that these 
issues required further inquiry.  An interim order was issued which ordered 
that the vetting of all Judges and Magistrates must cease for fourteen days.
381
  
The Vetting Board announced that it was going to ignore the court order to 
stop the vetting process.
382
 The Kenyan Attorney-General and the Minister 
of Justice both supported the Board‟s decision to ignore the court order, as 
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In the case of Jeanne W. Gacheche v The Judges and Magistrate’s Vetting 
Board,
384
 in which judgement was delivered on the 30
th
 of October 2012, all 





The Kenyan High Court held that it would have jurisdiction to intervene and 
review processes and decisions of the Vetting Board, to the extent where the 
Board‟s actions were shown to have exceeded the Board‟s statutory and 
constitutional mandate.
386
 The High Court would have jurisdiction to 
consider and adjudicate upon alleged breaches of fundamental rights and 
freedoms arising from the Vetting Board‟s mandates under the Constitution 
and the Vetting Act.
387
 It would have further jurisdiction to determine any 
questions ancillary to or consequential upon the vetting process. 
 
The results of the judgment were that the removal or de-gazetting by 
President Kibaki of any of the four judges who had made an application to 
the High Court (Gacheche, Omolo, Bosire and Nyamu) were stayed.
388
 The 
order to stay their removal would remain in force, pending the hearing and 
determination of the applications made by the affected judges which would 
all be heard separately.
389
 Yet the order made by the previous court which 
suspended the vetting processes by of the Vetting Board was set aside. The 
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 Rob Jillo „Kenya: Court block removal of four judges by Vetting Board‟ Capital News 30 October 2012, 





Board was permitted to continue its work as per its mandate by the 




Both the Law Society of Kenya (which was an interested party in the initial 
case) and the Vetting Board were outraged by this decision, and the Law 





On a judgement dated approximately the 26
th
 November 2012 it was 
reported that the Court of Appeal suspended all other challenges against the 
vetting of Judges and Magistrates, pending the determination of the Law 
Society of Kenya‟s appeal of the recent High Court decision.
392
 They also 
declined to stop the operations of the Vetting Board until the determination 
of the Law Society‟s appeal was finalised.  
 
The Court of Appeal also extended the High Court‟s orders to prevent the 
removal or de-gazetting of the aforementioned four judges until the appeal 
was finalised.
393
 The Court of Appeal also directed that the appeals to the 
High Court‟s decision be re-directed and heard on a priority basis.  
 




 Njeri Rugene „Judges vetting cases stopped‟ The Sunday Nation 26 November 2012, available at 
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Eventually, led by members of the Constitution Implementation Oversight 
Committee, Parliament amended the Act.
394
 Section 22 of the Vetting Act 
was amended by inserting the two provisions after subsection (2). The new 
provisions provided  that: (1) „[any] judge or  magistrate who requests for 
review shall, pending the decision of the Board under this section, be 
suspended from office‟; and (2) „removal or a process leading to the removal 
of a magistrate from office under this Act shall not be subject to question in, 
or review by, any court‟. This Amendment Act commenced on the 14 
December 2012 and provided that it was the Vetting Board who had the final 
determination on the validity of any of its decisions.  
 
As discussed above, the Vetting Board continued the vetting processes by 
making determinations in both December 2012 and January of 2013. The 





Despite the many interruptions and challenges, the Vetting Board had 
seemingly succeeded in vetting the majority of Kenya‟s judges on their 
suitability to continue in office or not.  
 
 
4.9 CRITICISM OF THE VETTING PROCEDURE 
 
In June of 2012 Professor Migai Akech (an Associate Professor at the 
University of Nairobi), published an article entitled „Is the vetting process 
                                                 
394
 Business Daily „Vetting board rules on fate of judges‟ Business Daily 21 December 2012, available at 
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Vetting-board-rules-on-fate-of-judges/-/539546/1649048/-/7xjta2/-
/index.html, accessed on 20 January 2013. 
395
 Maureen Waruinge „Kenya: Magistrates now to feel the heat‟ The Star 14 January 2013, available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201301141336.html, accessed on 20 January 2013.  
102 
 
really fair to judges?‟.
396
 This opinion was based on six reasons, the most 
important of which will be discussed below. 
 
His first reason was that the criteria the Vetting Board was using to 
determine the suitability of a candidate to continue in office could not be 
applied objectively.
397
 This was because the guidelines did not provide the 
appropriate weight that the Board must afford to each individual criterion. 
Nor were any guidelines provided as to what was the relevant threshold or as 
to how much each of these criteria should be applicable to each candidate for 
them to be deemed „suitable‟.
398
 The second reason was that these criteria 
could be applied selectively depending on the candidate, therefore making it 
unfair as each candidate did not have to meet the same criteria as others.
399
 
Akech also felt that the Board failed to take into account Kenya‟s previous 
political situation when they evaluated certain conduct of members of the 
judiciary. 
400
 Therefore, unrealistically high standards had been applied to 
the conduct of the judiciary during those times. In some circumstances it was 
noted that a minority of the members of the Board felt that some conduct 
had to be assessed „in the context of the repression of the times‟.
401
 His last 
reason draws parallels with one of the main reasons why some South 
African judges felt that the judiciary should not have had to account to the 
TRC,  this reason being that judicial independence would be undermined if 
previous rulings were effectively „re-tried‟ during such proceedings. 
Akech‟s comments that it was evident in the Board‟s previously released 
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determinations, that the Board had in fact made findings on the merits or 
correctness of previous decisions of the judges who were vetted.
402
 Judicial 
independence had been undermined, as in other countries, he explained, 
judges were not often disciplined on the merits or correctness of decisions 
they had made.
403
 In these countries judges were only disciplined if flagrant 
errors existed in their decisions, if their decisions were motivated by bad 
faith, or showed continuous patterns of legal inaccuracy. 
 
Despite these criticisms, pre-election polls showed that Kenyans‟ confidence 
in the judiciary had increased from twenty-seven percent after the 2007 





4.11 THE 2013 KENYAN ELECTIONS 
 
Kenya held her next presidential elections in March 2013.
405
  Many political 
observers made dire predictions that this election would be a repeat of the 
2007 election violence.  Despite these predictions, the March 2013 elections 
were relatively successful and held in a free and peaceful atmosphere.
406
 
When the twelve million voters took to the election polls, there were no 
eruptions of violence as there had been in previous years. 
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The election results announced on 9
th
 March 2013 revealed Uhuru Kenyatta 
of the Jubilee Alliance as the winner of the presidential election, with an 
estimated fifty percent of the vote.
407
 Raila Odinga of CORD (Coalition for 
Reform and Democracy) had followed closely with an approximate forty-




Whilst the election had been peaceful, it had not been perfect. Problems 
were recorded as follows:  
A new biometric voter identification system failed, and then, after the polls 
closed, the electronic system to transmit results directly from the polling 
places to election headquarters crashed. Mr. Odinga‟s side said it was a 
conspiracy [against them]. The election commission said it was an 
accident. Election officials then had to tally the results manually, which 




However, unlike in previous years, Odinga‟s party decided on this occasion 
to choose the courts as the medium in which to declare their unhappiness 
and solve their issues. On the 16
th
 of March 2013 Odinga‟s side filed an 
application with the Supreme Court to have the election results and 
associated processes declared null and void.
410
 Previously, several civil 
society groups had sought an injunction from the Kenyan High Court to stop 
the processing and renouncing of results.
411
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Whilst contesting the validity of the election results was not a good indicator 
for the ultimate success of a free and fair election, the very important fact 
remains that Odinga‟s side chose the courts as their medium for trying to 
achieve justice. 
 
Odinga said of the matter: 
 
We have a newly independent judiciary in which we in CORD and most 







 of March 2013 the Kenyan Supreme Court ruled that the 
elections had been conducted in compliance with the Kenyan Constitution 
and the law, and that Kenyatta and the Jubilee Alliance had been validly 




Mr Odinga graciously, and in a dignified manner accepted the court‟s 
decision and announced that he would abide by it. He also announced that, 




The fact that the elections were peaceful and free and that Odinga and 
CORD chose to voice and solve their grievances in the Kenyan courts rather 
than via violence in the streets, demonstrates that the reforms implemented 
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by the 2010 Constitution are working.
415
 These reforms have clearly laid the 
foundation for cleaner elections and an independent judiciary.  
 
As discussed previously, the de-centralisation of power (especially the 
circumvention of the Chief Justice‟s powers) has clearly contributed to the 
increased trust in the courts. A „culture of Rule of Law, democracy and 




The vetting process has achieved some success in getting the public and 
political parties to believe that due to this process, the courts are independent 
arbiters of justice that can be trusted to adjudicate upon an election issue. 
The fact that CORD sought relief within the court system and resolved to 
abide by the Supreme Court‟s decision, demonstrates an emerging faith in 




The bittersweet fact of the matter was that in January 2012 the ICC 
confirmed charges against Uhuru Kenyatta of Crimes against Humanity, for 




Whilst the outcome of the election was perhaps not the most favourable, at 
least it appears that the transitional justice mechanism of vetting has 
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In the aftermath of the 2007 election crisis, different types of transitional 
justice mechanisms have been used to achieve justice for the atrocities that 
occurred. These mechanisms included the vetting of the judges, a truth 




The TJRC (Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission) of Kenya held 
hearings for victims of injustices during the 2007 election crisis, but this 
truth commission did not hold institutional hearings for sectors that may 
have contributed to the violence in the manner that South Africa‟s did. The 
TJRC found that one of the factors that encouraged the perpetuation of the 
gross violation of human rights in Kenya up until the 2010 Constitution was: 
 
 
[the] consolidation of immense powers in the person of the President, 
coupled with the deliberate erosion of the independence of both the 




Hence the TJRC also recommended that: 
 
[The] judiciary apologise to the people of Kenya for failing to address 
impunity effectively and perform its role of deterrence to prevent the 
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perpetration of gross human rights violations, during the period between 12 




So far there has been no formal statement or apology issued by the Kenyan 
judiciary addressing the TJRC‟s recommendations. The hearings held and 
the report compiled by the TJRC have shed more light on how the Rule of 
Law deteriorated in Kenya in the first place, and how systematic corruption 
in the judiciary contributed to this. Yet, it is unlikely that this process has 
had much effect on improving the public opinion of the judiciary. 
 
The vetting of the Kenyan judiciary received many challenges from within 
the judiciary itself, and was the object of criticism as to the objectivity of the 
vetting process. Despite these challenges, it appears that the vetting process 
has made a successful contribution to achieving the objectives of judicial 
reform in Kenya. It re-established the legitimacy of the judiciary, improved 
the public confidence in the judiciary, and established the judiciary as an 
independent institution free from bias in favour of a particular political 
affiliation. This is demonstrated by the fact that Odinga and his party, 
CORD, chose to place their trust in the courts as the means to decide if the 
2013 election results were valid or not.  
 
The concept of taking a „justice-sensitive‟ approach to institutional reform is 
clearly illustrated in the example of the vetting of the Kenyan judiciary. The 
process has provided accountability for past injustices of the judiciary, by 
removing members not deemed „suitable‟ from office. Such a removal 
means that the judicial officers responsible for certain injustices are no 
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longer employed. Informal corrupt structures or networks associated with 
past abuse have also been dismantled, thereby strengthening the 
accountability and independence of the Kenyan judiciary for the present and 
future. 
 
The vetting process also helped re-establish and strengthen the Rule of Law 
in Kenya in two ways.  The fact that each judicial officer had to account to 
the Vetting Board for their past conduct and that the results of these 
determinations were published helped deepen the understanding of how the 
Rule of Law had deteriorated. The vetting process, unlike that of the „radical 
surgery‟, was conducted according to the principles of due process, which 
also contributed to the re-establishment of the Rule of Law. In 
summary, the vetting process contributed substantially to achieving certain 
objectives of judicial reform in Kenya. 
 
It is submitted that the extent of the vetting process‟s contribution to 
achieving the objectives of judicial reform in Kenya was equal to that of the 
2010 Constitution‟s. However, the contribution of the vetting process held 
more significance, and was the real catalyst for the reform of Kenya‟s 















This dissertation sought to determine whether it is important for the future 
development of the legal systems in post-authoritarian and post-conflict 
states to confront the unjust past legacy of their judiciaries. The method used 
was to assess the extent to which dealing with the unjust past records of such 
judiciaries, by means of transitional justice mechanisms, had contributed to 
achieving the objectives of judicial reform in South Africa and Kenya. 
 
At the points in time selected for analysis, both countries had emerged from 
their respective circumstances due to negotiated political compromises. 
Once these political compromises were reached, both countries had adopted 
new Constitutions. In both South Africa and Kenya, the dilemma then arose 
of what would become of the judges currently in office, once these new 
Constitutions came into force. 
 
The independence and legitimacy of their respective judiciaries had been 
severely compromised during South Africa‟s authoritarian regime and 
Kenya‟s election conflict. It was important that the past record of each 
country‟s judiciary was understood and addressed. 
 
Important differences did exist in South Africa‟s and Kenya‟s political 
situations. These are reflected by the different transitional justice 
mechanisms chosen to reform their respective judiciaries, and the extent to 





South Africa was emerging from years of oppressive rule under the 
Apartheid government. Judicial vetting had not been a viable option due to 
the nature of the political compromise reached. Thus, the TRC Legal 
Hearing dealt with the past record of the Apartheid judiciary. This hearing 
made a small but significant contribution to achieving the objectives of 
judicial reform. The main catalysts for judicial reform in South Africa were 
the Interim and Final Constitutions and the creation of the CC. 
 
Kenya‟s judicial reform process occurred in the aftermath of the 2007 
election crisis. During the drafting of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, 
Kenya‟s Committee of Constitutional Experts opted to vet the members of 
the Kenyan judiciary remaining in office. Both the 2010 Constitution and 
judicial vetting made significant contributions to achieving the objectives of 
judicial reform in Kenya. However, it is submitted that the judicial vetting 
was the main catalyst for judicial reform in Kenya. 
 
Therefore, judicial vetting in Kenya made a greater overall contribution to 
achieving the objectives of judicial reform than the TRC Legal Hearing did 
in South Africa. Earlier in this dissertation, a theoretical analysis was 
provided of how both these transitional justice mechanisms could contribute 
to achieving the objectives of judicial reform in post-authoritarian and post-
conflict states. In this discussion it was concluded that truth commission 
processes could, for various reasons, greatly contribute to achieving certain 
objectives of judicial reform in such contexts. However, this theoretical 
discussion translated differently in the practical example of the South 




On this precedent it is submitted that as a transitional justice mechanism, the 
vetting process is more suited to addressing the unjust past record of a 
judiciary than the truth commission process. The nature of the vetting 
process compared with that of the truth commission process is responsible 
for this. Legal systems foster environments that are formal, strict and 
unemotional. Consequently, a forum which is similar in nature would be 
more appropriate to address the conduct of judicial officers who adjudicate 
in such systems.  
 
In contrast truth commissions are emotive forums with a psychological 
focus. In the South African case, participation in the truth commission 
process was voluntary for the judges, and no system of punitive sanctions 
existed.  
 
If one analyses how the vetting procedure took place in Kenya, it was 
similar to a procedure of how a JSC would ordinarily deal with misconduct 
committed by judicial officers. The vetting process was compulsory if the 
incumbent members of the judiciary wanted to remain in office. There was 
also the punitive sanction that these judges might have not been considered 
suitable by the Vetting Board to continue in office.  
 
On this reasoning, it is recommended that the vetting process is the more 





However what is demonstrated by both cases (irrespective of the extent of 
the contribution), is that merit does lie in confronting the unjust past legacy 
of a judiciary. It demonstrates that it is not wise to ignore the past legacy, 
and simply start from a clean slate in a new constitutional era or under a new 
governmental regime. It has proved better (as shown in these cases) to use 
the unjust past record as a tool for reforming a judiciary. This dissertation 
has determined that it is important for the future development of legal 
systems in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states to confront the unjust 
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